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Key words 
Copper mining will mean the business of mining copper and subsequent sale thereof. 
Economic growth  
Investment climate will mean the conditions prevailing in a host country which make it 
attractive as an investment destination. 
Foreign Direct Investment  
Privatisation will mean the divesture of state owned enterprises into private hands. 
Revenue will mean the income that is realized from the taxes charged on copper mining 
activities. 
Sustainable Development 
Utilization will mean the distribution and subsequent re-investment by the state of income 
realized from copper mining taxes  
Windfall mining tax A tax levied by government against certain industries when economic 
conditions allow those industries to experience above-average profits. Windfall taxes are 
primarily levied on the companies in the targeted industry that have benefited the most from the 
economic windfall.  
 
ZCCM will mean Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines, Zambia's largest commercial enterprise, 
generating most of the country's foreign exchange earnings 
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Chapter 1 
 
1. BACKGROUND 
 
The copper industry has dominated the mining scene in Zambia for more than seven decades 
since the first commercial mine was opened in 1928. Despite the existence of other minerals, 
copper is likely to continue to play a major role as Zambia’s major export for many years to 
come. At its peak in the late 1960s and early 1970s, copper mining accounted for more than 80% 
of the country’s foreign exchange earnings, over 50% of government revenue and at least 20% of 
total formal sector employment.1 However, its performance declined from the mid-1970s and by 
the end of the 1980s copper mining was no longer the driving force which had been the engine of 
the country’s industrial and social development. Developments on the international stage, such as 
the collapse of commodity prices in the mid 1970s and the unprecedented increases in oil 2 added 
to its poor performance. 
In 1969, the copper industry was nationalised to maximize the returns to the Zambian people. 
The rationale being that under state control, copper revenues would be used to benefit the 
nation.3 During the period 1969–1975 the country saw an unprecedented investment in the 
construction of new schools, hospitals and roads, using surpluses from copper revenues. 
4However, the copper industry faced a number of challenges after 1975 as a result of under-
capitalisation, over-manning, poor technology and low copper prices on the international 
market.5  
  
                                                            
1 Simutanyi Neo 2008 Copper mining in Zambia; The developmental legacy of privatisation, occasional paper 165, 
Institute for Security Studies  
2Burdette Marcia 1984. Was the copper nationalisation worthwhile? in Woldring K (ed), Beyond Political 
Independence: Zambia’s Development Predicament in the 1980s. Berlin, New York and Amsterdam: Mouton 
Publishers 
3 Lungu John 2008 The Politics of Reforming Zambia’s Mining Tax Regime, A Paper presented at the Mine watch 
Zambia Conference: Politics Economy Society Ecology and Investment in Zambia Oxford University 
4 Simutanyi Neo 2008 Copper mining in Zambia; The developmental legacy of privatisation, occasional paper 165, 
Institute for Social Security  
5 Ibid  
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While the contribution of the copper mining sector to Zambia’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
declined, the importance of the industry to export revenue remained significant. The crisis 
occasioned by the poor performance of the copper industry was felt in Zambia’s inability to 
finance social welfare programmes, such as education and health. People’s living standards 
deteriorated, inflation rates were high and the buying power reduced. 6 
 
This crisis coincided with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank recommended 
policies aimed at improving the economy as a condition to access funding.7 These loans were as 
stated, not without conditionalities which included among other things, trade liberalization and 
removal of subsidies, general wage freeze, and devaluation of the currency. 8 
 
 As the state mining conglomerate Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited (ZCCM) was 
loss making, the Zambian government granted it large subsidies.9 However, as it remained the 
major foreign exchange earner in the economy, the one-party state, under President Kenneth 
Kaunda, directed ZCCM to provide social services in mining areas that the government was no 
longer able to provide on a large scale. The ZCCM continued to provide social services to 
mining communities even when the economy was in crisis and the company was performing 
poorly. 10 
 
In the early 1990’s Zambia privatised its mines and signed Development Agreements with the 
new buyers, who are mostly foreign companies. The low revenues from copper sales are partly 
as a result of Development Agreements which prescribe tax concessions for mining 
                                                            
6 Ibid 
7 Ibid 
8 Craig John 2001 Putting Privatisation into Practice; The Case for Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 39, 3 (2001) Cambridge University Press 
9 Simutanyi Neo 2008 Copper Mining in Zambia; The Developmental Legacy of Privatisation, Occasional paper 
165, Institute for Security Studies  
10Ibid 
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companies, for periods ranging from 10 to 15 years, and a reduction in mineral royalty taxes 
from the statutory 3% to 0.6%,11 which is undoubtedly one of the lowest in the world. 
 
There are serious concerns regarding not only the need for the nation to receive a fair share 
from the exploitation of its natural resources, but also because of the poor corporate social 
responsibility of the new mine owners and the appalling health, safety and environmental 
standards on the mines.12 
 
Undoubtedly, the increased mining activities have brought increased profits to mining 
companies given the high copper prices on the world market and the favourable investment 
climate in Zambia. 13 
 
However, while the privatised mines have recorded large profits, the Zambian government 
acknowledges that revenue from copper as a proportion of government income has been very 
low. 14 
However, much as the governments need to mobilise more revenues is understandable, there is 
a risk that proposed changes might lower the country's competitiveness in attracting more 
investors to the sector.15 
It was recently announced that government would introduce a mining windfall tax that would 
earn the treasury at least US $415 million in the year 2008 alone.16  Effectively, mineral taxes 
                                                            
11 Fraser Alistair and Lungu John 2007. For whom the windfall? Winners and losers in the privatisation of Zambia’s 
copper mines. Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia, Printec, Lusaka 
12 Simutanyi Neo 2008 Copper mining in Zambia; The developmental legacy of privatisation, occasional paper 165, 
Institute for Security Studies 
13 Ibid 
14 “Zambia President axes copper mines tax breaks” available at www.forbes.com,accessed on:  13.09.08 
15 Miners concerned about proposed Zambian Windfall Profits Tax, 2008 Mineweb available at www. 
mineweb.co.za/mineweb/view/mineweb/en/pages67?oid=44583 
16 “Zambia President axes copper mines tax breaks” available at www.forbes.com,accessed on:  13.09.08 
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would increase from an average of 31.7% to 47%.17 The mineral royalty tax levied on copper ore 
produced has been increased from a negotiated rate of 0.6 percent to the statutory 3 percent, 
while the tax on corporate profits has jumped from 25% which was negotiated to the 30%.18 This 
change in the fiscal policy will be implemented along side the windfall tax levy. This revenue 
from mines if put to proper use can lead to an improved economy.  
 
1.2 Problem statement: 
 
The last four years have seen a surge in mining activities throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, partly 
in response to policies of economic liberalisation, privatisation and favourable conditions for 
foreign direct investment.19 The renewed interest in mining activities comes as a result of a boom 
in commodity prices occasioned by increased demand from China and India. Thus, foreign 
investors have arrived on the scene to either buy former state mining companies, now privatised, 
or to start new mining operations.20 
Zambia has in the last few years created an investor friendly atmosphere which has seen 
increased investments in the country especially in the mining sector. The copper prices on the 
world market are on a record high21 as compared to when the copper mines where sold. Mining 
companies have made and continue to make huge profits. Mining being the driving force for the 
economy, there has undeniably not been a corresponding increase in the growth of the Zambian 
economy.  
 
                                                            
17 Magande Ngandu 2008 Budget speech delivered to National Assembly on 25th January 2008, available at: 
www.zambiabudget.zm accessed on  9.08.08 
18 Lungu John 2008  The politics of reforming Zambia’s mining tax regime, A Paper presented at the Mine watch 
Zambia Conference: Politics Economy Society Ecology and Investment in Zambia, Oxford University 
19 Simutanyi Neo 2008 Copper mining in Zambia; The Developmental legacy of privatisation, occasional paper 165, 
Institute for Security Studies  
20 Campbell B (ed) “Regulating Mining in Africa; for whose benefit? “Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika institutet. 2004 
21 Fraser Alistiar and Lungu John 2006. For whom the windfall? Winners and losers in the privatisation of Zambia’s 
copper mines. Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia, Printec, Lusaka. 
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The boom in copper prices has not been translated to national wealth and there seem to be no 
serious plans to re-invest the surpluses.22 Government has since re-negotiated the  development 
agreements, providing for increased minerals and royalties taxes, sought new concessions with 
mining companies, with the objective that with increased revenue from the mines, there will be 
seen increased spending on education, health, roads and other sectors of the economy.  Suffice to 
say that the Development Agreements did not provide for increased tax, the government has 
imposed a windfall tax,23 to fully benefit from the current high copper prices on the world 
market. A windfall tax by its very nature is meant to cover a situation where circumstances under 
which an agreement was negotiated change for the better, and is meant to capture or claw back 
the profits or benefit coming with the change in circumstances.  
This paper will look at whether imposition of windfall tax is a renegation by government of its 
obligations under the signed Development Agreements, whether the mining windfall taxes are a 
once off thing (or will there be another change should the world market price of copper change?) 
and whether they can translate into meaningful development leading to economic growth. The 
paper will further discuss the classical theory on foreign direct investment and what host nations 
like Zambia need to do to benefit from Foreign Direct Investment. A comparative analysis will 
be done with Chile on the implementation and gains from mining windfall taxes and whether 
there are any lessons to be learnt.  
1.3 Research objective 
The main objective of this paper is to find out whether a balance can be struck between the 
benefits to be obtained from mining activities within the host country through imposition of a 
windfall mining tax and the profits to be made by the owners of the mines. Whether indeed 
imposition of a windfall tax is a solution to improve social welfare. 
1.4 Research hypothesis 
                                                            
22 Simutanyi Neo 2008  Copper mining in Zambia; The developmental legacy of privatisation, occasional paper 165, 
Institute for Security Studies 
23 Available at: www.investopedia.com A tax levied by governments against certain industries when economic 
conditions allow those industries to experience above-average profits. Windfall taxes are primarily levied on the 
companies in the targeted industry that have benefited the most from the economic windfall, most often commodity-
based businesses. Accessed on  17.08.08 
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This paper is premised on the fact that currently Zambia is not benefitting from the high prices of 
copper on the world market due to the tax provisions in the mining Development Agreements 
signed with its investors which imposes no social responsibility obligations on them while 
allowing externalization of profits. 
1.5 Scope 
This study will be limited to the copper mining windfall profits andwindfall tax in Zambia and 
how efficient management can bolster funding for social programs. 
1.6 Significance of the Research 
The significance of this research is to show that putting in place a favourable investment climate 
is not enough for a country to fully benefit from FDI, that other factors must also be present. 
 
1.7 Research Methodology 
This research will be conducted by reviewing the literature on windfall profits and taxes. 
 
1.8 Proposed Content 
Chapter one is a brief overview of Zambia’s copper mining dependence over the years, the recent 
challenges faced with the privatisation of the mines and the need for the country to benefit from 
the high copper prices. 
Chapter two will examine the history of copper mining in Zambia, the decision by the Zambian 
government to nationalise privately owned enterprise and how the rapid growth of the copper 
industry driven by favourable world prices through the late 1960’s and 1970’s transformed 
Zambia as a model for a country moving rapidly towards economic independence, 
industrialization and an end to poverty. 
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Chapter three will look at the privatisation of the mines and analyze whether the creation of a 
favorable investment climate has led to an increased flow of foreign direct investment. In 
particular this research will analyse the Classical theory on foreign direct investment and 
whether the choice on the approach taken will maximize the gains from foreign direct 
investment. 
The fourth chapter will review the performance of privatization in Zambia and analyse the 
Mining Development Agreements, both the previous and re-negotiated Agreements vis-à-vis the 
incentives and tax provisions and whether the introduction of the windfall mining tax is a once 
off event.  
Chapter Five as a case-study will be a comparative analysis on the implementation of the Chile 
copper windfall mining tax and the lessons that can be learnt by other developing countries 
seeking to benefit from their mineral wealth through Foreign Direct Investment. 
The conclusion will give recommendations on how proper implementation of the copper mining 
windfall combined with the existence of other factors can lead to meaningful development and 
economic growth for Zambia.  
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Chapter 2 
 
2 Introduction 
 
This Chapter will look at the history of copper mining in Zambia from the colonial period when 
the colony was called Northern Rhodesia till after independence, in modern day Zambia. It will 
look at how in the colonial period, copper mining was used simply to generate income for the 
colonial masters with no benefit accruing to the host state, and how eventually, with 
Independence, Policy changes brought in nationalisation of this important industry to not only 
match with the economic aspirations of the politicians in seeing that ownership was given to the 
state but also that economic development was achieved. 
 
2.1 History of Copper Mining: 1924 - 1963 
 
Zambia has relied on mining for its development ever since commercial copper mining started in 
1928.24 Despite the existence of other minerals, copper is likely to continue to play a major role 
as Zambia’s major export for many years to come.  
 
During colonial rule, (1924 -1953) and the period of the federation, 1953- 1963, effective power 
over the economy resided outside Northern Rhodesia in the hands of international companies and 
their Directors. Copper mines were the major source of revenue for the colony. They paid 
monies to the local authority first colonial and later federal based on a combination of royalty 
and export taxes.25 The revenue was vital to the state and tended to act as a point of leverage 
between the state and any local group wishing to start some counter veiling power against the 
mines.26 No other economic activity in Northern Rhodesia even began to compare with the scale, 
capital intensity and profitability of the mines. 
                                                            
24   Lungu John  2008 The Politics  of Reforming Zambia’s Tax Regime A paper presented at the Mine Watch 
Conference, Politics Economy ,Society Ecology and Investment in Zambia, Oxford University 
25 Marcia Burdette 1984 The Class, Power and Foreign policy in Zambia, Journal of Southern Africa Studies, Vol. 
10 No.2 
26 Ibid. 
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Zambia’s copper is mostly imported by the industrialized countries such as Japan, Britain, 
France, and Germany. Its price is dependant on the state of the economies in the industrialized 
countries.  With more construction works going on in these industrialized countries, Northern 
Rhodesia was seen as a cheap source of copper to supply these industries. For instance, in 1973, 
higher prices of the metal prevailed through out this year; the contrast may be with 1976, when 
the industry went through a difficult time. The price of copper fell steeply owing largely to the 
world economic recession. It collapsed from a peak 1400 pounds per tone on 1st April 1974 to 
fluctuate between 500 pounds and just over 600 pounds per tone from December 1974 to April 
1976.27  
To appreciate copper mining in Zambia, it is important to look at the history from the colonial 
era.  Beginning in the 1890’s European finance capital in the form of the British South Africa 
Company (BSA) began to penetrate this area in search of base metals for the expanding 
economies. Authorities had left Northern Rhodesia and had no control over the colony; their 
presence in the form of two early mining companies was still there, through Roan Selection Trust 
and Zambian Anglo American Corporation.28 These were two subsidiaries of two multinational 
corporations, American Metal Climax Inc. and Anglo American Corporation respectively. It was 
these two companies that determined the major sector of the colonial capital economy, the 
copper industry, controlling the sales and marketing of Zambian refined copper as well as pricing 
arrangements.29 The earlier producer price system of the 1950s had collapsed and was replaced 
by a system of prices based on the London Metals Exchange (LME) quotations for copper, 
cobalt, lead and zinc. This new system could have given the producer states more control over 
prices than before. Yet European buyers still purchased Zambian copper directly from foreign 
companies.30 Arrangements were made by the multi national companies’ head quarters and their 
local managers, rarely consulting the exporting nation.  
 
                                                            
27 Muna Ndulo  1987 Mining Rights in Zambia  Kenneth Kaunda Foundation, Lusaka  
28 Slinn Peter 1972, The Legacy of BSA Company: The historical Background” Economic Independence and 
Zambian Copper; A Case History of Foreign Investment ed Bostock Mark and Harvey Charles NY, Praeger 
Publishing Co.  
29 Marcia Burdette  1984 The Class, Power and Foreign policy in Zambia, Journal of Southern  Africa Studies, Vol. 
10 No2  
30 Ibid  
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Due to the profit intentions of these foreign companies and their limited interests in Northern 
Rhodesia as a whole, a large percentage of the surplus which otherwise could have been invested 
locally was drained away.31The loss was permanent. As there was no intention to develop a well 
balanced economy with locally based downstream production for example, Northern Rhodesia 
became a classical “disarticulated economy”.32 It produced copper which it could not consume 
and consumed imported luxury, capital and intermediate goods which it did not produce.33 
 
Among the terms of decolonization which new Independent states had to accept were entrenched 
clauses protecting the mineral rights of the mining company’s. In Zambia, the BSA which owned 
the mineral rights in pepertuity was forced to give up its claims to mineral rights for a small 
compensation.34 The settlement brought under government control, a valuable source of revenue, 
namely mineral royalties. 
 
The copper industry had a lot of influence in the economy of Zambia; need less to say that most 
of the industrial wealth resided in foreign hands. Consequently, the budget of Zambia’s 
government was affected because the major export copper is a cyclical product having periods of 
recession alternating with high prices. The resultant fiscal instability was compounded by the 
fact that most productive sector was in the hands of the two multinational corporations, in which 
Zambia’s economic conditions were only one element in their world wide corporate strategies.35 
2.2 Independent Zambia: 1964 - 1992 
Continuing foreign economic domination was a politically volatile issue for the Zambian 
leadership. While they had the political independence, they had no control over the economy, 
especially the mining sector that was driving the economy. The obvious step was to nationalize 
ownership of the sectors of the economy dominated by externally based individual or companies. 
                                                            
31 Ibid 
32 Ibid 
33 Ibid 
34 Ibid 
35 Burdette Marcia 1977 Nationalisation in Zambia; A critique of bargaining theory, Canadian Journal of African 
Studies vol. XI No. 3  published by Canadian Association of African Studies  
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36Individual enterprises could continue to be managed by expatriates. In addition limitations 
were placed on dividend remittances for all foreign companies on local borrowing and on 
expatriate controlled retail trade.37 
In 1969, through a request by then President, Kenneth Kaunda, 51% of the largest privately 
owned industry was nationalized by the Zambian government. Kaunda requested the foreign 
mining companies to turn over 51% of their assets in Zambia to government.38 This action by the 
government was part of a series of reforms called the “Zambian Economic Revolution” which 
began with the take over of smaller expatriate owned industries in 1968.39The outcome of the 
1969 step by government was a set of agreements which created a partnership between the two 
multinational corporations and the leadership of Zambia in the operation of the copper industry. 
New corporations, Roan Consolidated Mines and Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines were 
created out of the older companies as joint ventures, with Government as the majority partner. 
The President also announced that mining company’s perpetual mineral rights were rescinded. 
That prospecting, exploration and mining licences would be necessary in the future, that a new 
mineral tax was being introduced based on profitability that Mining Development Corporation 
would be set up to over see the operations of the mines.40 
Negotiations followed with government obtaining majority share of the equity without loss of 
foreign expertise. Mining companies were compensated fully over a period of time through 
redemption of bonds at 6.5% interest rate.41 In 1973, the government paid in full, the purchase of 
the 51 percent shares in mining companies.42 
After independence in 1964, Zambia embarked on its first negotiations to change the tax regime 
affecting the mining companies.43 This was necessitated by the fact that during the colonial era 
and the early years of the independence period, mineral royalties accrued to the British South 
                                                            
36 Muna  Ndulo 1987 Mining Rights in Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda Foundation, Lusaka,   
37 Ibid 
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid 
41 Ibid 
42 Mupimpila Christopher et al 2007 Global Product Chains, Northern Consumers, Southern Producers and 
Sustainability; Copper from Zambia A paper prepared for the United Nations Environmental Programme.  
43 Lungu John  2008 The Politics  of Reforming Zambia’s Tax Regime A paper presented at the Mine Watch 
Conference, Politics Economy ,Society Ecology and Investment in Zambia, Oxford University 
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African Company.44 This was because the British South African Company held the mineral 
rights. With the new changes, mineral rights were vested in the state. 45 The copper industry was 
nationalised to maximize the returns to the Zambian people. It was then envisaged that under 
state control, copper revenues would be used to benefit the nation especially with raining 
revenue for infrastructure development.46 During the period 1969–1975 the country saw an 
unprecedented investment in the construction of new schools, hospitals and roads, using 
surpluses from copper revenues.47  
 
In 1973, the president made a new announcement to alter the previous relationship with foreign 
mining companies. There would be redemption of outstanding bonds, cancellation of contracts 
and the “reversion of the two mining partnership companies to self management.48 MINDECO 
would no longer oversee operations of the mines, this would be placed under the Ministry of 
Mines and Minerals with financial responsibility,49 normal taxation and exchange provisions 
would apply against the profits of the minority shareholders.50 The apparent intention it would 
appear was to obtain legal right to change tax laws and foreign exchange and to give to the 
indigenous Zambians the top positions in the industry. President Kaunda gave jobs to his 
supporters as a form of reward for supporting his party. 51 
 
After nationalisation, the government changed the tax regime affecting the copper mines since 
now the government had become the majority shareholder.  The Mines and Minerals Act 1970 
made mandatory participation a condition for the establishment of any mining enterprise by a 
foreign investor. This was not a novel provision in the context of the history of mining activities 
in Zambia. 
 
                                                            
44 Ibid 
45 Kaunda Kenneth 1969 Towards complete Independence ,Government Printer, Lusaka 
46 Neo Simutanyi 2008 Cooper Mining in Zambia’ The Developmental Legacy of Privatisation Occasional paper 
165 Institute for Security Studies 
47 Ibid 
48 Press conference by President Kaunda, August 31 1973 in Lusaka, Zambia 
49.Ibid 
50 Ibid 
51 Burdette Marcia 1977 Nationalisation in Zambia; A critique of bargaining theory, Canadian Journal of African 
Studies vol. XI No. 3  published by Canadian Association of African Studies 
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In the early period of mining, BSA Company required every registered mining location to be 
held by the registered holders on joint account with it in the proportion of two thirds to the 
registered holder and one third to the BSA Company.52 The main reason for the introduction of 
the policy of government participation, therefore was to ensure that mining rights holders 
operated within the framework of the overall economic and social goals of the country and also 
ensure that the mining industry was not completely foreign owned and controlled53. Government 
in its Second National Development Plan emphasized the need to have a favourable investment 
climate in order to encourage the private sector to increase its level of interest in exploiting the 
mineral potential of the country.54 It emphasized that legislation must always reflect this 
objective. 
 
There was the realization of the need for foreign capital in the development of the country’s 
mineral resources. Among the benefits to be enjoyed from such partnerships were capital and 
know- how, which were mostly from abroad. As such, there was no complete nationalisation.55 
 
Before 1969, there were three main taxes on mining rights holders in Zambia; the royalty tax of 
13.5% based on the London Metal Exchange copper price; the export tax of 40% if and when the 
copper price exceeded US$300 per long ton at the London Metal Exchange and 
income/corporation tax of 45%.56  This was a form of windfall tax   meant to capture profits in 
periods when copper prices were high.  This was also a tax on production. While the first two 
taxes were revenue based, the corporation tax was profit based. Corporation or income tax was 
charged on profits, after the deduction of royalty and export tax. 
 
Royalty describes the rent/tax payable to the owner of the minerals purely on the basis that 
he/she is the owner of the mine. 57 The concept of royalty is that it is a share of the product or 
profit reserved by the owner for permitting another to use his property. In Zambia, until 1964, 
                                                            
52 Muna Ndulo 1987 Mining rights in Zambia Kenneth Kaunda Foundation, Lusaka. 
53 Ibid 
54 Second National Development Plan, 1972  
55 Ndulo Muna1987 Mining rights in Zambia Kenneth Kaunda Foundation, Lusaka. 
56 Curry Robert 1984 Problems in Acquiring Mineral Revenues for Financial Economic Development: A case study 
of Zambia during 1970-78. American Journal of Economic and Sociology, Vol.43 No.1. 37-52 
57 Ibid  
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the royalty was fixed by and was payable to the BSA Company. (The royalty was incorporated in 
the prospecting licence). It became payable to the Zambia Government by virtue of the Mining 
Ordinance (Amendment) Act, No. 5 of 1965.  Royalty was at 13.5% on the price of copper with 
a reduction per ton, in periods when copper prices were low.58 This was a tax on production and 
as such, it increased production costs. The mining companies considered the royalty to be 
retrogressive in that it discouraged investment in mineral production.59 
 
After independence, tax was continued by the Zambian government for some time largely 
because it proved to be very profitable in terms of actual government revenue. It was also a 
political decision in that the government was not very sympathetic to mining rights holders on 
this issue as they had done little about it under the BSA Company. 60 
The figures estimated by the royalty formula bore little relation to modern costs of production 
but was estimated in during the colonial period when costs were low. Royalty ignored the costs 
and the government always received the same royalty share of each long ton on mineral 
produced regardless of great fluctuations in the cost of production to the miner in different 
mines. The costs of extraction from the various mines of course varied tremendously in most 
aspects of production arising from differences in ores and several technical factors.61 
 
During the period 1964- 1969 the rate of development of mines was very slow. The mining 
companies gave the tax system as the only reason for the lack of adequate mineral development. 
Another reason was that mining companies suspected that  nationalisation would come sooner or 
later and were not anxious to re-invest back into capital which could be expropriated in the near   
future at a competition level which was undefined or  less than economical.62 
 
The new tax structure became effective in 1970. The mineral royalty and the export tax were 
replaced with the mineral tax of 51% and a corporation tax of 45%. Thus the rate of tax on 
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profits was 73.05 percent.63 During this period, mining rights holders were given financial relief 
through removal of burdensome taxes. It was the expectation of government that development 
would come through private initiative. Despite the tax reforms, mining companies continued to 
externalize profits and were unwilling to re-invest profits meaningfully. During the period 1975 -
1978, little or no dividends were declared.64 The mining rights holders cited the rate of taxation 
as the factor inhibiting development in that it reduced their liquidity; 
 
“The change over to a taxation system based entirely on profits is a development which I very 
much welcome, though the new low grade combined rate of mineral and income tax is 73.5% is 
very high indeed; too high I would judge to give adequate encouragement to the development of 
new low grade mining projects.”65 
 
 Although these measures raised the much needed revenue for the government, the mining 
companies argued that such high taxes on production and profit discouraged investments and 
growth of the industry.66 With high revenues obtained from the mines, the government had no 
incentive to enter into any agreements until problems in the industry started surfacing. The 
falling copper prices and the rise in input costs resulted in foreign exchange shortage for the 
country. The Second National Development Plan was based on the expectation of a decent profit 
from the sale of 900,000 tonnes of refined copper per year.67 By the mid 1970s it was obvious 
that both the production and price calculations were far off target. The spending programmes for 
the country, however, were tied to the estimated availability of foreign exchange from mineral 
sales. The increasing downturn in the Western industrial system plus the rising costs of imports 
(particularly oil) and the declining terms of trade for Zambian copper meant that the Zambian 
economy slowly slipped into an ever worsening recession.68 The ability of the Zambian officials 
to stem this decline was limited by the fact that major forces which control the copper market 
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were beyond Zambian reach. Zambia’s ability to negotiate the price for the copper was 
weakened by a chronic oversupply of copper on the market. Despite the formation of a producer 
cartel of copper exporters (CIPEC), the price continued to drop and stockpiles continued to rise. 
The overall efforts by CIPEC to lessen the decline were generally ineffective. Moreover, 
substitution materials such as aluminium and plastics competed actively for copper’s use in the 
construction and electronic industries. A plan to develop a buffer stock soak up the excess 
primary copper overhanging the market also came to naught.69 The price for copper continued at 
a low annual level, despite some brief upturns such as the one in 1979. 
 
 It was at that stage that the government started negotiations with the copper mining companies. 
In the budget speech of 1976, the Finance Minister stated that; 
“In order to encourage higher foreign investment in the country, I have decided that investors 
will be allowed to remit either 15% paid up capital of their companies or 50% of their profit 
whichever is less.”70  
 
In 1976, it was anticipated that the mining sector had contributed almost half of the GDP, 92% of 
the export earnings and 53% of government revenues to the government.71 Costs of production 
of ore had increased on top of high prices for imports, economic diversification programs were 
slowed down or halted, the agriculture sector had declined badly and recurrent expenditures 
absorbed a growing percentage of the Budget. These problems were particularly critical because 
the engine for the Zambian economy- the copper industry- was in a period of severe recession 
because of low copper prices72  
 
At its peak in the late 1960s and early 1970s, copper mining accounted for more than 80% of the 
country’s foreign exchange earnings, over 50% of government revenue and at least 20% of total 
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formal sector employment.73 However, its performance declined from the mid-1970s and by the 
end of the 1980s copper mining was no longer the driving force which had been the engine of the 
country’s industrial and social development.  
The cumulative effect of a continued dependence on an export sector which was vulnerable to 
cyclical prices and on a development strategy of import substitution became painfully clear in the 
1970s. The managers of the state and the state controlled industries began to turn to debt 
financing to keep the industries and the state solvent. Zambia began to be entrapped in a new 
dependency – financial institutions of the West.74 
 
The financial position of government in the late 1970s stood in stark contrast to that in the 1960s. 
When Zambia attained its independence in 1964, the country inherited a rather favourable 
situation. There was a relatively low external debt and good promise of foreign exchange to pay 
off any and all debts and to keep the national balance of payments in surplus.75 In 1971- 1972, 
temporarily depressed prices for copper meant less foreign exchange for the country. The gap 
between revenues and expenditures in international accounting was filled by running down 
reserves. Consequently, these reserves were not available to pay off new debts accrued by the 
state in the later 1970s.  Little new foreign direct investment came in the country and despite the 
first nationalisation (1969), the economy was being drained of income.76 
 
The foreign minority partners were averaging from K11million to K13 million per year for their 
service fees.77  After 1975, this outflow was stanched when the mines became “self managed”. 
Yet, in order to purchase that self management privilege, the GRZ had paid US$226.3 million78 
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to the minority partners. This money was raised by the government borrowing $150 million on 
the Eurodollar market, which at the time carried an interest rate of 13 percent.79 The difference 
between the loans and the re-nationalisation costs were bridged by the government officials and 
banks using the remaining national reserves.80 These economic difficulties were exacerbated by 
geopolitical events which put heavy pressure upon the Zambia political economy. 
 
Instability within the region leading to continued attacks on the Benguela Railroad ensured that it 
remained closed. Strife over Namibia and Angola meant that portions of Western Zambia were 
often vulnerable to attack and even occupations by South African troops. The war  in and around 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) disrupted rail and road routes as well as dislocated some vital trade 
links, for South Africa was still a major supplier of goods to the Zambian economy.81 Since most 
South African goods travelled to Zambia via Zimbabwe, this put the Smith regime astraddle 
Zambia’s primary trade routes. Even after the Independence of Mozambique in 1975, which 
lessened the strain along Zambia’s eastern border, the problems were not over. The decision of 
the FRELIMO Government in Mozambique to shut down the rail road from the  Rhodesian 
border to Beira in 1976 affected Zambia as well, effectively shutting down another  transport 
link. This situation became severe such that when the price of copper went through a cyclical up 
turn and there was plenty of copper available in Zambia’s stockpiles, the mine managers still 
could not guarantee that the copper would make it to its Western European and Asian markets.82 
NCCM and RCM lost these potential sales at a time when they needed the cash flow. 
 
From 1969 to 1974, the combined incomes from the mining sector contributed 32 to 48 percent 
of GDP and were responsible for over 90 percent of the total foreign exchange earnings of the 
economy.83 Between 1975 and 1979, however, mineral taxes, income taxes on the companies 
and dividends to the state were non- existent or miniscule. In 1977, the contribution of the copper 
industry to GDP dropped to 11 percent.84 
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As the costs of producing Zambian minerals continued to rise, their attractiveness to consumers 
declined despite devaluation of the Kwacha in 1976 and again in 1978. When the additional costs 
of sales (insurance, freight, sales, and commissions) were added to the production costs the 
Zambian mines found themselves producing and selling copper near the break even point and 
sometimes even at a loss. By the end of the decade in 1979, Zambia was listed as a high cost 
producer of copper.85 
 
The pressure to export did not however, abate because the companies needed the revenues and 
the state needed the foreign exchange generated by the sales of minerals abroad. Strangely, the 
mines which supply about 90 percent of the foreign exchange earnings for Zambia also 
consumed about 60 percent of the value of imports. The mines therefore, were producing lower 
profits than before and their foreign exchange earnings were far less than had been hoped for. 
With foreign exchange receipts down, national reserves were run down to pay external debts and 
new loans had to be negotiated for the state and for the mines. The transportation problem which 
had rocked the state worsened. The delays which contributed to the export and import schedules 
meant constant shortages and higher costs of sales and inflated prices for imported goods. The 
overall trade picture was gloomy in 1977-1978.86 
 
In reaction to the economic dislocations, the Government announced a set of austerity budgets, 
cutting back deeply in such programmes as food subsidies and putting tight controls over import 
licences. Without the additional revenues from mineral sales to offset the expenditures , the 
Government officials turned to deficit financing and to the multilateral lending and aid 
institutions of the market economies of the West, particularly the  private commercial banks, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and IBRD.87 Loans and grants from commercial banks and 
bilateral governmental aid sources tend to intertwine and interact with IMF and IBRD financing.  
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The overall effect should be understood to be a combination of these financing sources with the 
host state’s own economic policies.  
 
Hence, the government which prior to the mid- 1970s had not had extensive dealings with these 
foreign financial centres, now had to assemble a set of policies to cope with its new situation 
appropriate to the status of a large-scale debtor nation. 
 
Prior to 1975, Zambia had not resorted to the multilateral funding institutions extensively. As 
mentioned above, the country had surpluses on current account most of the years since 
Independence. In most of the years, it had had a positive balance of trade with the rest of the 
world. Traditionally, export credits and guarantees to the mines, some private commercial loans 
and occasional bilateral loans as well as banks internal reserves had proven sufficient to serve the 
country’s needs. 88 After 1975, the safety nets had weakened. Balance of payments slipped into a 
chronic deficit.  From 1973 to 1979 the balance of payments was only in surplus twice, and the 
overall payment arrears were sizeable. In years when the copper prices were high, the payment 
arrears were almost paid off but the overall external debt of the state continued to rise. Facing a 
possibility of a steeper deficit, Government and Central Bank officials negotiated a 
compensatory financing facility with the IMF in 1976.89 There was no requirement for the 
government to draw on this facility; rather the funds were earmarked to offset the balance of 
payments and payment arrears to foreign debtors.90 Conditionalities were attached for the 
extension of this facility to the Zambian government such as devaluing the Kwacha (local 
currency), reduce on local/domestic spending and invoke a series of money saving policies.91 For 
the mining industry, measures included a reduction in the labour force from an estimated 66,000 
in 1976 to 51,000 in 1986.92 This was done by way of retrenchment, voluntary retirement and 
dismissals.93 
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It is not clear whether it was the pressure from the IMF/World Bank or conservative fiscal and 
monetary policy from technocrats and civil servants that led to these decisions being made. 
Despite putting in place such measures, the economy continued to stumble further, with 
increased debt and servicing, $173million in 1973.94  
 
 Given the scale of Zambian mining and GDP, such a debt was not particularly onerous, with a 
deep recession in the copper market and GDP decline, foreign exchange receipts to the state 
continue to decline and the ability of government to repay the debts become even more 
uncertain. Debt servicing started consuming a large percentage of export income, thus taking it 
away from such areas as capital expenditures.95 
 
In 1978, Zambia returned to the IMF for another loan. The IMF instead promised SDR $390 
million. In return Zambia promised to devalue the Kwacha again, by 10%, reduce the money 
supply by 8.07% and cut back even further on government spending.96 Despite these 
interventions, total debt continued to rise; debt services reached $190 million in 1978. Zambia 
further held discussions with the World Bank on balance of payments and development loans. 
Within the same year, government negotiated another Eurodollar loan, this time for $57 
million.97 It was difficult for Zambia to negotiate favourable terms for such loans.  
The growing indebtedness of the state was mirrored in the mineral industry. Typically, big 
industrial ventures carry a heavy burden of debt to finance various capital expenditure 
programmes. As long as equity is high and the company is making money, re-financing is not a 
serious problem. But with equity not expanding in the Zambian mines and copper not being sold 
at good profits, the “gearing” of the companies appeared less favourable to foreign financial 
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analysts.98  As an indicator of financial stress, the government became a major lender to its own 
state owned industries, NCCM and RCM.99 
By March 1978, RCM and NCCM owed the Central Bank of Zambia over $200 million.100 Later, 
the state indirectly lent money to the mines in a complex trade of debt for equity. Despite loans 
from the Government, the long period of low copper and cobalt prices and low profits for the 
companies meant that earnings were too small to finance the companies from within.101 
A solution to try and lessen the financial pressure on the companies was to try to reduce costs.  
To lessen the mines expenses and to plan for more efficient capital outlays, the management of 
NCCM and RCM invoked a series of cost cutting policies and merged various operations of the 
mines.102 As part of the $400 million stand- by - loan to Zambia in 1978, the IMF had requested 
that the mining companies restrict their borrowing to rather strict limits and try to cut costs.103 It 
is important to note that while the IMF cannot force restrictions, since ultimately, the state has 
the authority over the mines; it did apply pressure to influence the mines to cease their 
borrowings and to take some deep cuts in operating and technical areas. 
The most affected were the capital expenditure programmes of the mines. More visible was the 
announcement in 1981, to merge the two companies, NCCM and RCM, to create a new 
company, Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Limited (ZCCM) which was one of the largest 
copper mining companies in the world.104 As a short term measure, a few savings were made. 
However, the financial squeeze affected Zambia’s foreign policy.105 
ZCCM was created as a merger of the two state mining enterprises which had themselves been 
created when the Zambian copper industry was nationalized in 1969.106 Thus, ZCCM was a 
combination of state and private interests. The main share holders in the company were the 
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Zambian government, with 60.3 percent of the shares, and the South African conglomerate 
Anglo-American Corporation (AAC) which controlled 27.3 percent.107 AAC also held pre-
emptive rights to purchase any shares sold by the government once the government share in 
ZCCM fell below 50 percent, and through its representation on the ZCCM Board of Directors, 
had an effective right of veto over the sales of any major assets.108 
The formation of the ZCCM had been a response to the prolonged depression in the international 
price of copper which had began in mid 1970’s109 It was envisaged that the centralized control of 
the industry would allow for more effective use of resources and during the 1980’s a number of 
restructuring initiatives were undertaken with the assistance of the World Bank and outside 
Consultants.110 
Towards the end of the 1980s ZCCM took up several responsibilities that the state was no longer 
able to fulfill effectively, such as the provision of health and educational services, tourism, 
transport and farming.111 The ZCCM not only performed these added responsibilities but also 
paid the salaries of some political appointees, purchased motor vehicles for government and was 
responsible for providing ‘free’ air transport to senior members of the Kaunda regime. 112 The 
diversion from the core business of mining and the politicisation of the ZCCM board led some 
observers to conclude that this may have been responsible for the poor performance of the mines 
in the 1980s and early 1990s.113 
At the beginning of 1990’s ZCCM was the fifth largest copper producer in the Western world, 
accounting for up to 4 percent copper of the production of refined copper.114 However, the 
company faced problems related to both the immediate financial viability and its long term 
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development.115 The level of reinvestment was also low and copper production had reduced 
drastically by a quarter between 1982 and 1990.116 Over this same period, ZCCM’s debt had 
risen from a third of its total asset value to over half, and its ability to service this had become 
contingent on rescheduling agreements and the support of the Zambian government.117 To 
maintain effective operations, ZCCM needed to undertake new investment. However, it was 
unlikely that the funds required could be generated from within the company.118 
The collapse of the Zambian economy in the 1980s was intimately related to the poor 
performance of the copper mining industry.119 Some unprofitable mines and shafts were shut 
down in Ndola, Mufulira, Luanshya and Chililabombwe. This went hand in hand with a 
retrenchment of mine labour and the scaling down of ZCCM’s social responsibilities to the 
communities.120  
Refinancing of ZCCM and establishing it as an independent private sector mining company 
emerged as an option on the government’s agenda.121 
Under strong encouragement from the IMF and other external lenders, Zambian technocrats  and 
civil servants designed a set of policies: to create a more attractive investment climate in Zambia 
for foreign capital; to build a larger and more productive agriculture sector on commercial rather 
than peasant farmer or cooperative lines; to expand the manufacturing sector; and to resuscitate 
the mines.122 This was meant to open the economy further to foreign capital. This in turn 
required some adjustments of the prior economic nationalism that had been contained in the 
Economic Reforms. Despite the situation there was still a need to tighten foreign exchange 
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measures to seal loopholes in the outflow of foreign exchange.123 This was contrary to the 
expectation of foreign owners who would have preferred to repatriate a high percentage of the 
profits they made overseas. To rely on international aid or grants to help supply capital to the 
Zambian economy was unrealistic given the worldwide decline in the percentage of this aid from 
most of the advanced industrial states, the traditional sources of such capital.124 
 
By 1984, Zambia’s long and medium term foreign debt amounted to $4,500 million, about one 
fifth to private companies and banks, the remainder to foreign governments and multilateral 
institutions.125   Zambia was one of the countries in the world with very high external debt.126 
Much of this was incurred to try and offset the reduction in the copper export earnings. Despite 
repeated rescheduling, debt service (interest and principle payments on earlier borrowing) for 
government and government guaranteed debt alone absorbed about half of export earnings, 
aggravating balance of payments difficulties. Merchandise imports had dropped to about one 
third of their 1970 volume, falling by almost half between 1980 and 1985 alone.127 
Increasingly, the Government relied on credit from the IMF to repay old debts and to maintain 
imports. 128 By 1984, it owed IMF $600 million, and as a precondition for obtaining new loans, 
Zambia agreed to modify long-standing debt policies. In particular government guidance of the 
economy was diluted by abolishing fixed credits for almost all goods, giving parastatal 
corporations more autonomy, relaxing foreign exchange controls, and cutting government 
spending. According to the IMF, these measures would foster efficiency in production, reduce 
consumption to release funds for investment, and ameliorate balance of payment difficulties. 
These prescriptions seemed to be the only viable solution. This has been critiqued on theoretical 
                                                            
123 Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Development and Planning, Annual Review: Performance of the Zambian 
    Economy 1975 (Lusaka, December 1975)  
124 Burdette Marcia 1984 The Mines, Class Power and Foreign Policy in Zambia, Journal of African Studies, Vol. 
10. No.2  
125 Makgetla Neva 1986 Theoretical and Practical Implications of IMF conditionality in Zambia, The Journal of 
Modern African studies, 24,3  
126 Copper Mining in Zambia available at www.newint.org/easier-english/mining/copper.htlm 
127 Mwananshiku Luke Minister for Finance, Statement at the official opening of the workshop on the debt problems 
    facing Zambia, University of Zambia Lusaka 26th November 1985. 
128 Makgetla Neva 1986 Theoretical and Practical Implications of IMF conditionality in Zambia, The Journal of 
Modern African studies, 24,3  
 
 
 
 
‐ 26 ‐ 
 
grounds and in the light of the Zambian realities.129 This however, is beyond the scope of this 
paper and this paper shall therefore, not delve into that discussion. 
 After 1980, government wage and salary policies tended to reinforce income inequality.130 
Average real wages plummeted between 1974 and 1983, falling about 40 percent.131 As IMF 
conditions brought price rises and wage restraint, real wages fell, on average between, 10 and 15 
percent a year.132 However, government granted the largest increments, in both percentage and 
absolute terms, to the top salary earners.133 ZCCM conditions were in comparison to other 
parastatals more superior, despite the low sales.134 To pay the high salaries, government had to 
abolish subsidies on essential commodities, affecting the entire lower –income group.135 
Government spending could be seen on things like financing the housing or offices for the small 
high income group,136 imported construction materials, largely for expensive buildings. In 1982 
an estimated  $35 million left the country as a result of shopping trips  in neighbouring countries 
by well off individuals.137 The purchase of 71 Mercedes Benz vehicles from South Africa for a 
S.A.D.C.C summit cost almost $2 million.138 
According to the IMF, the use of resources to maintain the living standards of the high income 
group, and to repatriate profits, was required to encourage investment.  The Zambian parastatals 
did not bring about the balanced development o the economy.139 They failed to establish more 
self reliant production, while funds continued to flow overseas and to well of individuals, as well 
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as into inappropriate investments.140 The deficiencies in the in the production structure, however 
followed largely from the reliance on market forces in selecting investments, rather than from the 
public ownership itself.141 
The government’s political legitimacy was thus severely undermined by an economic crisis that 
saw the copper industry no longer able to provide employment to the majority of the Zambian 
labour force or act as the engine of growth for the entire economy.142 By 1989, there were 
repeated urban food riots and industrial unrest leading to unpopularity of the ruling party United 
National Independent Party (UNIP) and its President, Kenneth Kaunda. 143 
 
In 1990, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) was formed, headed by Zambia 
Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) leader Frederick Chiluba. They won the elections in 1991.144 
For their manifesto the MMD promised to liberalise the economy and privatise state owned 
enterprises. The ascendancy to power of the MMD ensured a return to neo-liberal approaches to 
economic management. Therefore, the realities on the ground, the pressure from the donor 
countries and the international finance institutions and the change in political thinking made the 
State to rethink the country’s development strategy. 
  
Because the country’s economy has historically hinged on copper mining, the privatisation of the 
mines was critical to the country’s development agenda.145 It was thought then that privatisation 
of the copper mines would attract foreign investment into the sector.146 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
In Conclusion,  it is admitted that there were reasonable growth rates in the 1960’s and early 
1970’s primarily due to high copper production and prices and increases in maize and 
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manufacturing output, as well as increases in numbers of social facilities and physical 
infrastructure.147 However, the nationalisation programme in general and import substitution in 
particular, proved very costly.148 Zambia failed to diversify the economy from copper mining 
and import substitution strategy proved unsustainable.149 The decline in the world copper prices 
since 1974 contributed to economic decline causing reduced government expenditure on 
development; balance of payment problems; and inability to service external debt.150 Lack of 
savings by the government during periods of high copper prices to cushion the impact of any fall 
in copper prices worsened the situation.151 Extensive state intervention gave rise to 
bureacratisation, corruption and uncertainty, discouraging productive private investment and 
foreign trade initiatives.  
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 Chapter 3 
3.Introduction 
This chapter will look at the decision by the government to adopt IMF and World Bank 
recommendations to privatise previously nationalised industries. This paper will particularly 
focus on the privatisation of the mines, whether this was the solution to the economic woes 
Zambia was facing. It will also look at the policies Zambia put in place to create a favourable 
investment climate and whether this has increased the flow of Foreign Direct Investment to the 
country. Thus will in effect, analyse the classical theory resting on Foreign   Direct Investment. 
3.1 Privatisation 
3.2 Background  
The increased government control over the mining industry in Zambia had concomitant changes 
in the country’s system of government. During the era of President Kaunda, the majority of 
parastatals were managed by the state under umbrella management institutions. Under pressure 
from the donors, Zambia had begun to sell state owned companies during the last stages of the 
second republic.152 The new government under the multiparty system of democracy had stressed 
its unwavering commitment to macroeconomic policy reforms, liberalisation and privatisation of 
state owned companies, including ZCCM.153 
In the 1980’s  the World Bank and IMF Started to use the leverage that came with Zambia’s 
massive debts to them and its inability to fund government revenues from mining income  to 
push the country to adopt economic liberalisation policies.154 
Following the recommendations of the IMF and World Bank, the government undertook 
economic policy reforms to rejuvenate the economy from 1983.155  In 1987, facing protests 
against its austerity measures in its adjustment programme, the Government rejected the 
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conditions of its loan and instituted a “New Economic Recovery Programme” that limited debt 
service payments to 10% of net export earnings.156 Zambia’s refusal to pay at the IMF’s 
preferred rate resulted in almost all of Zambia’s donors deciding collectively not to lend the 
country any assistance.157  Within eighteen months, Zambia rescinded this decision; the price of 
future support would be compliance with donor priorities.158  
However, the Structural Adjustment Programmes worsened, rather than improved the economy. 
159Agricultural and manufacturing outputs and exports failed to increase significantly.160 This 
was attributed to the inadequate incentives for farmers due to uncompetitive exports of 
manufacturers, high inflation, unemployment and rising external debt.161 
 
A Technical Committee within the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry set up in 1990 had 
carried out some preliminary work on the privatisation of state owned enterprises. However by 
the time of the political transition in 1991, no privatisation transactions had taken place. The 
process of privatisation only gathered momentum in 1995.162 From its inception, apart from 
some key Ministers, the privatisation process had only lukewarm support even within the 
cabinet. 163 As a result, neither the mines nor the utility companies were included in the 
governments’ original privatisation portfolio.164 A careful plan in which the small companies 
were privatised first was opted for. Despite the lack of support and slow beginning of the 
privatisaton process, and most notably, the failure to take action towards the mining sector, by 
1996, the privatisation programme in Zambia was cited as one of the government’s key 
successes.165 By 1997, 224 companies of a total of 275 tranched for privatisation were sold and 
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the government had committed itself to tender the mining conglomerate by February 1997.166 
The World Bank attributed the success of privatisation programme to the fact that the process 
through the Zambia Privatisation Agency was predominantly private sector driven, with little 
interference from government.167 Others condemned it for the de-industrialisation, deepening 
debt and increasing poverty that came with it.  Foreign Companies bought the largest and most 
viable firms with very little profit staying in Zambia.168 World Bank eventually accepted that 
despite massive lending and massive adjustment programme “ The supply response from the 
extensive privatisation of small and medium enterprises was limited….outcomes could have been 
significantly  better… in terms of faster and stronger resumption of economic growth and 
reversal in per capita income and poverty trends…. If the relevance and efficacy of Bank 
strategy had been higher. Outcomes of many Bank operations and of the overall Bank program 
were unsatisfactory.” 169 
3.3Privatisation of ZCCM 
 
 Since Zambia is heavily dependant on copper, the privatisation of the mining conglomerate was 
the main issue in terms of potential economic turn around. It was only in 1996, that the 
government accepted advice to begin the process of the privatisation of Zambia Consolidated 
Copper Mines (ZCCM) in unbundled units by open tender, with the aim of reaching agreements 
before 1997.170 The move on the privatisation of the mines was decisive in securing funding 
from the multilateral donors and thereafter, the bilateral donors. 
The Zambian government had examined a number of options for transferring ZCCM to the 
private sector. The aim of such examination was to meet three core objectives. The first was to 
access the new investment required to secure the future of the Zambian mining industry as a 
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major world producer of refined copper.171  In order to achieve this, the bulk of new funds would 
have to be sought from outside Zambia, and there were concerns over the resulting level of 
foreign control. The second objective was to find a strategy which either retained some degree of 
local control over the industry or otherwise qualified the influence of the new owners.172  The 
final objective of the government was to secure the best selling price that could be obtained for 
the assets.173 This would primarily reflect the importance of the company and the desire not to be 
seen as selling the nation’s asset too cheaply.174 
Three principal options were examined by the government, each with different consequences for 
the resulting structures of ownership and control. The first option was for a single or group of 
foreign transnational mining corporations to acquire a controlling interest in ZCCM.175 The 
second option was to restructure ZCCM by dividing it into a number of different companies 
which could be offered for sale on an individual basis.176 This appeared on the government’s 
agenda in 1994, following the submission of a World Bank funded study. The third option, 
which also emerged in 1994, was to transfer ZCCM intact into the private sector as an 
independent mining company under the control of existing management.177 Each option had 
advocates and critics, and was subject to a number of constraints which   this paper shall not 
delve into. 
The new Zambian Government began informal discussions with Anglo American Corporation on 
the future of ZCCM in 1992. In doing so, it recognised not only that AAC was the largest private 
shareholder in the company, but that on the basis of the existing rights, its cooperation was 
essential for the success of any privatisation proposal.178 This coincided with the changes in the 
corporate strategy of AAC.179 First the transition to majority rule in South Africa was re-opening 
opportunities for the company to expand its interests through out Africa, and especially in states 
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like Zambia which had strongly supported the struggle against apartheid.180 Secondly AAC was 
intent on expanding its interests in base metals such as copper, and was searching for potential 
investment opportunities.181 However, some members of AAC’s senior management doubted 
that these could best be achieved by reviving their interests in the Zambian copper industry, and 
discussion between AAC and the Zambian government indicated considerable differences in 
their respective views on the potential value of ZCCM.182  Within Zambia, there were concerns 
over the implications for the nation’s economy should control of its prime asset be monopolized 
by a foreign mining company.183  It was strongly believed that if AAC gained control of ZCCM, 
the future development of the Zambian copper industry would become subsidiary to AAC’s own 
corporate interests.184 ACC had a reputation for taking a long term view in acquiring assets and 
of biding its time until it chose to develop them.185It was feared that this approach could delay 
the replacement of Zambia’s existing sources of ore. It was also suggested that it was highly 
unlikely that AAC would commit the scale of resources required to rehabilitate existing 
operations and to develop new mines.186 
 The option of restructuring the Zambian copper industry as an integral element of privatisation 
was proposed in a World Bank funded study.187 The report advised that ZCCM be unbundled, 
rather than privatised intact, stating that the strongest argument for not privatizing ZCCM as a 
whole is that whoever (presumably foreign) should own an undivided ZCCM will have a very 
strong influence on the government of Zambia and national economy.188 To overcome this, it 
was proposed that each of the mining divisions should become a separate operating company. A 
majority interest would be sold to private investors, while ZCCM would retain minority interest 
and supply technical and support services to them. It provided an opportunity to tap the resources 
of a number of foreign mining companies, while avoiding the domination of the copper industry 
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by a single one. ACC was opposed to this proposal process which it characterized as being long, 
difficult and expensive.189 It believed that the Kienbaum proposals underestimated the degree of 
interdependence between units within ZCCM, and that unbundling would create new costs by 
duplicating facilities. As individual units, higher cost mines would be more susceptible to 
periods of low copper prices, and the over all effect of disintegration of the company would be to 
decrease the combined value of the assets. Many of these concerns were shared by others. They 
doubted that ZCCM could be easily divided due to its existing financial and technical 
integration.190  They perceived little advantage in supporting a highly controversial proposal of 
questionable viability.  Government decided to undertake a number of further studies to address 
the issues that had remained unanswered.191 
Refinancing ZCCM and establishing it as an independent private sector mining company was an 
option considered by the Zambian government.192 In part, it reflected the influence of the 
successful privatisation of the Ghanaian state Enterprise Ashanti Goldfields.193 In May 1994, 
ZCCM announced a two year “Interim Short Term Plan” aimed at concentrating capital 
expenditure on the most profitable units, disposing of unprofitable and underutilized units.194  
The aim of the sales of these peripheral assets was not the division of the company, as envisaged 
by the unbundling option, but rather the maintenance of the core activities of the company as a 
single unit. Proposed to be sold off were Zinc and Lead mines respectively. This was confirmed 
in a ten year plan, formulated by the management of ZCCM, based on the company remaining a 
single entity, financed through retained earnings and debt, and without any additional equity 
investment.195  
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Along side these proposals, then President and the Finance Minister outlined proposals for the 
government to substantially reduce its shareholding in ZCCM.196 Initially, up to 10 percent of the 
company’s shares would be sold to the Zambian public, with a similar percentage subsequently 
offered to the foreign investors. This factor had to comprehend with the pre-emptive rights of 
AAC.197 Although the governments holding of around 60 percent of the equity of ZCCM would 
allow for the placement of an initial 10 percent of equity, further changes in ownership would 
require agreement with AAC. Indeed, even if this was possible, the question of whether ZCCM 
could have found investors willing to support an international sale of equity is open to question. 
Prior to its floatation, Ashanti Goldfields had been exclusively rehabilitated and its management 
had gained the confidence of international investors. By comparison, at ZCCM the rehabilitation 
work was still to be done and it was doubted that the existing management had the ability to 
achieve it.198 
ZCCM was in the end, privatised through the unbundling option and envisaged a two stage 
approach to privatisation. In the first stage, the majority shares in the operating companies would 
be sold to new investors, with ZCCM maintaining a minority interest in each new company.199 
With ZCCM transformed into an investment company with minority shares in a range of 
independently managed mining companies, stage two would commence. In this the government 
would sell all or most of its shareholding in ZCCM to domestic and international investors. The 
Zambian government emphasized that the strategy offered the opportunity to transfer the 
industry into the private sector, mobilise new investment, diversify ownership and create new 
opportunities for Zambian participation.200 However, its re-emergence over other option was a 
result not only of its own merits, but also of a number of developments which re-defined the 
opportunities available to the Zambian government.201 
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Despite the measures being undertaken by ZCCM, its on going viability in its existing form 
became increasingly doubtful.202 The company’s level of copper production had been on a 
downward trend since the beginning of the decade, and after 1993 its profitability had 
evaporated.203 The “Short Term Interim Plan” was failing to meet its targets and this continued 
deterioration led, in late 1995, to the government requesting technical assistance from the World 
Bank to formulate a new action plan.204 
 The outcome of these studies was a further restructuring of ZCCM management and the 
appointment of a number of expatriates to key positions within the company.205 In addition, 
ZCCM’s own attempts to dispose of peripheral assets proved to be unsuccessful. Many industry 
observers held ZCCM responsible for this arguing that overly restrictive qualifying criteria had 
excluded participation of many potential investors.206 Together these developments further 
undermined the credibility of ZCCM’s existing management, and increased doubts as to whether 
the company could enter the private sector as an independent entity.207 
The separation of one of the big projects, Konkola Mine Deep Project, from the rest of ZCCM 
had a number of consequences for the privatisation of the company.  First, it removed from 
ZCCM the prime assets that could attract a transnational mining company to seek control of the 
company as a whole. 208 With this project detached from the future of ZCCM, AAC indicated to 
the government that they were not interested in acquiring a controlling interest in ZCCM, and 
would be willing to waive their pre-emptive rights in the context of privatisation.209 Secondly the 
separation diminished the future prospects of the company as an integrated unit. This project had 
offered ZCCM a replacement for its steadily depleting sources of ore and without them, the 
future position of the company as a major integrated copper producer was compromised. Along 
side this, the further declines in the production and profitability performance of ZCCM were also 
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decreasing the attractions of the company to the potential investors, and raised the issue of 
whether any company or consortium would have either the desire or the capacity to undertake 
the rehabilitation of the entire company. 210In this light, some further separation of the assets that 
constituted ZCCM appeared unavoidable.  
It was in this context that the unbundling of ZCCM into a number of separate operating 
companies emerged as the most viable option for transferring the company to the private sector. 
While AAC continued to state that unbundling was not the preferred option, having acquired 
rights over the biggest project, it indicated that it was willing to cooperate with the governments 
choice of privatisation strategy. 211 
When Zambia finally invited bids for the mines, only one bid was received from a Consortium 
comprising foreign companies.212The initial bid was unacceptable to the Zambian government 
but nonetheless accepted subject to contract.213 In the following months, the terms offered were 
revised downwards and this resulted in the collapse of the deal.  The agreement covered the 
purchase price, the capital expenditure that the consortium would be required to invest, the level 
of debt to be assumed and the residual equity to be held by ZCCM.214   The consortium cited the 
financial crisis in East Asia which materially reduced expectations of future copper prices and 
the physical deterioration of the assets which they sought to acquire as the major reasons for the 
revised terms.215Negotiations failed and the consortium disbanded. 
Pressure was brought upon the government to complete the first stage  of the privatisation 
process by donors who made the release of US$ 530million balance of payment support pledged 
in 1998 conditional upon the its completion.216 Concern was also raised within the Zambian 
Community over the costs of the continued delay in privatisation to the economy as a whole, 
most importantly, the viability of ZCCM as a going concern appeared to be increasingly 
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doubtful.217 The government and AAC, in 1998 drew up a survival plan aimed at maintaining the 
company as a going concern on a temporary basis while its remaining assets were privatised.218 
The plan underlined the critical financial state of ZCCM, warning that the company was facing 
liquidation, the overall impact of which would have far reaching consequences for the Zambian 
economy.219 AAC indicated its willingness to acquire a greater part of ZCCM than was 
previously anticipated. The terms of the sale agreed included a cash payment, committed 
investment for existing operations and a retained interest for ZCCM of 20percent of the equity, 
while in a parallel transaction, the Zambian government agreed to purchase AAC’s remaining 
shares in ZCCM.220 With pressure from donors and no other bidders having come forth, the 
Zambian government realized that the likely alternative to accepting these terms was the even 
less palatable liquidation of ZCCM.221 It took a further twelve months for the deal to be 
concluded. AAC’s failure to find a partner led to a revised agreement in 1999, which covered 
most of the assets included in the previous agreement. The government implemented a range of 
concessions to benefit the mining industry, including reduced rates of corporation tax and 
exemptions from import duties, which made the terms on which the assets were acquired even 
more favourable to the new owners.222  AAC chose to exercise its pre- emptive rights, and the 
expectation to develop the massive Konkola Deep Mining Project was part of the terms 
(KDMP). However, Anglo only waited until 2002 for the copper price to rebound before 
deciding that it was not going to, and that there was not as much money to be made in the short 
term from KDMP as they had hoped. AAC, along with other minority investors in Konkola 
Copper Mine- the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) and the World Bank 
International Financing Corporation (IFC) completely pulled out of Zambia, handing the mine 
back to state ownership.223 
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Production was threatened, while the government panicked greatly. In 2004, Government was 
finally relieved to sell 51 percent of interest to a British-Indian Company, Vedanta at a reduced 
price. Within a year, copper prices rebounded and Vedanta immediately recouped their 
investment. As the world copper prices fluctuate under the global trading rules, investors make 
short term decisions to maximize profits. Shares and share holding companies change hands 
rapidly.224 
Liberal economic policies, foreign assistance and democratization did not spur economic growth, 
sustainable development and poverty reduction.225  In spite of privatisation of the copper mining 
industry, production and world prices declined and have worsened since the 1990’s.  These and 
other problems of increased mining costs forced AAC to withdraw its investment in 2002, less 
than two years after purchasing a majority stake in the Konkola Copper Mine.226 This was a big 
blow to the copper dependant Zambian economy. 
The manufacturing industry collapsed due to mismanaged privatisation, and partly due to 
competition from Zimbabwe and South Africa manufactured goods.227 Further more, 
liberalisation was accompanied by corruption, which also contributed to poor economic 
performance.228 Rampant graft had permeated all the institutions of the government. There had 
been gross misuse of national resources including foreign assistance, mishandling of 
privatisation and electoral fraud.229 Privatisation of public companies was deliberately 
mismanaged to allow leaders in the ruling party and the government, and their international allies 
to purchase them cheaply, and at times, without depositing the money in the government treasury 
or distributing it to intended beneficiaries.230 In particular, the privatisation of the Zambian 
copper mines was seriously flawed.231 
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3.4 Creating a Favourable Investment Climate 
Privatisation of state enterprises is key to the government’s efforts to raise efficiency, promote 
private sector development and bolster economic growth.232 This was certainly the plan of the 
Zambian government when it decided to adopt the recommended policies of the World Bank and 
IMF in line with the policy of liberalisation. 
As part of the programme, the government enacted a sound legal framework which saw the 
creation of the Zambia Privatisation Agency, a statutory body mandated to carry out the 
privatisation of all state owned enterprises. The objectives of privatisation with regard to the 
mines were:233 
• Transfer control and responsibility to private sector mining companies  
                 as quickly as possible 
• Mobilise substantial amounts of committed new capital for the ZCCM 
• Ensure that ZCCM realized value for its assets and retained a 
                       significant minority interest in its principal operations 
• Transfer or settle the ZCCM’s liabilities, including third party debt 
• Diversify ownership of mining assets 
• Promote Zambian participation in the ownership and management of 
                 the mining assets 
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 An important note from the conduct of the privatisation is that though it was claimed that one of 
the objectives of privatisation was to promote transparency, this can hardly be said to have 
happened.234 The privatisation of the mines was implemented in an extremely secretive fashion 
and only in the recent past have the public had access to the Development Agreements that were 
signed.235 This is however, beyond the scope of this paper. Nor have some of the objectives of 
mine privatisation been fully met.236 In particular, there has been little Zambian participation in 
the ownership of the privatised mines.237 Further, as mentioned, the process of privatisation 
lacked transparency with some disastrous consequences for the government.238 Some of the 
investors stripped the assets of the companies they had bought while others did not even qualify 
to run the mines which were ultimately surrendered back to the government.239 
 The World Bank called for the change of the Investment Act as a condition to its 1993 PIRC II 
Loan. The most significant policy changes were enshrined in the 1995 Investment Act.  With 
regard to the privatisation of the mines, changes were made to the Mines and Minerals 
Development Act, 1972. 
The Investment Act established the Zambia Investment Center to assist companies through the 
process of buying into the Zambian Economy. It provided the General incentives that applied to 
all investors as well as special incentives for investors in a particular field such as mining, 
manufacturing and agriculture. The Act dispenses with the foreign exchange controls, allowing 
companies to expropriate, without interference, all funds in respect of dividends, principle and 
interest on foreign loans, management fees and other charges.  
Other efforts linked to the Investment Centre have involved for example, investment guarantees 
under which the Investment Act assures investors that property rights shall be respected and that 
no investment of any description can be expropriated unless Parliament has passed an Act 
relating to the compulsory acquisition of that property. Moreover in case of expropriation, full 
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compensation shall be made on the market value and must be convertible at the current exchange 
rate.  
Investors are guaranteed that investments will not be adversely affected by any changes in the 
investment Act for a period of seven years. The country has gone further by being a signatory to 
the Multi-lateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) which guarantees foreign investment 
protection in cases of civil strife, disasters, as well as other disturbances.  
 
The Mines and Minerals Development Act 1972, was repealed and replaced with the Mines and 
Minerals Act 1995.  This statute was in force during the negotiations of the mining Development 
Agreements. 
The Act provided for particular incentives to investors in the mining sector. Under the Act, tax 
paid for copper exported from Zambia- called a mineral royalty tax is charged at the rate of 3 
percent of the net back value of the minerals produced.240   As an incentive, the Act permits 
mining companies to minimize their income returns by allowing deductions for capital 
investment in mining.241 It also provides relief from paying customs duties on imported 
machinery and equipment required for any of the activities carried on or to be carried on.242  The 
Act permits the government to enter into Development Agreements with companies under which 
they may  renegotiate the rate of mineral royalty to be paid by each company and any such 
agreed upon rate  shall be the rate payable under the Development Agreement. 
These policies were not just recommendations from the World Bank or IMF. The Permanent 
Secretary from the Ministry of Mines in giving the governments position reported “The private 
sector wanted concessions so that when they take over these assets they would be able to 
recapitalize and at the end of the day, make these mines profitable. So in the Mining Act, you will 
find provisions for these concessions. The companies wanted to drive certain taxes down. And 
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this is how we came up with very low mineral royalties. Today I think we are the lowest in the 
whole of Africa at 0.6 percent of gross turn over for mineral royalties. This is how over the 
period, we have pegged the company tax at 25 percent for the mining sector, compared to 
manufacturing companies which are at 35 percent. And then on imports of capital equipment, 
these things are brought in duty free if they are brought in for mining operations and for 
exploration work in mining. Not only that we have made many items tax deductible when you 
come to income tax calculations. Capital investment is tax deductible and the interest that you 
pay on loans is also tax deductible, so that the whole package is very, very attractive.”243 
Taking the tax provisions in the Development Agreement signed between the Government of 
Zambia and Mopani Copper Mines, Government of Zambia and Konkola Copper Mines, the two 
largest copper mines, the following incentives were granted; 
• The government removed all foreign exchange controls to allow the 
mine owners to externalize profits, without a limit on how much could be externalized.244 
• With regard to tax it was agreed that the mining companies would pay 
tax and royalties in accordance with the applicable legislation.245 Further, that where 
there was a conflict between the Law and the clause on tax in the Agreement,246 the 
Agreement would apply. 
• The government undertook that it would refund mine owners Value 
Added Tax (VAT) within 30 days from the date of submission of the Companies monthly 
VAT return in respect of each accounting period. 
• Other incentives include the clause on Stability Periods in which the 
government agreed not to increase corporate income tax applicable to companies from 
those prevailing. Government would not impose any new taxes or fiscal imposts on the 
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conduct of normal operations. As an incentive, mine owners would not pay duty on 
electricity consumed.247 
Income tax would be payable at 25 percent. Carry forward losses where permitted for a period of 
10 years from which loss was incurred. This means that losses made in one year could be 
subtracted in subsequent years from taxable profits. 
Royalty was negotiated at 0.6 percent and companies exempt from payment in the first 5 years 
following completion of the Agreement. 
Other incentives include zero rating of customs and excise duties on all consumable items 
imported during the period up to the value of US$16,000,000 for the first 12 months up to 
US$10,000,000 for three years. 
The government undertook not to amend any of these tax regimes after the agreement was 
completed, for a period of 20 years or more. This would be in the Stability Period in which until 
the Development Agreement expires, the terms of the Agreements are legally binding and 
overrule/supersede any existing or future legislation where there is a conflict.248 
The Price Participation clause allows government to claw back profits when copper prices at the 
London Metal Exchange exceeds US$2,700 per tonne. The Government would claim back a 
percentage of each sale made. While this is a progressive clause, it is watered down by the fact 
that the payment on the government is deductible by the companies for income tax purposes. 
Consequently the income tax payable by the companies is reduced, a counter effect on the 
windfall tax, which had negotiations not been done due to pressure or from a desperate situation, 
would introduce a new source of revenue for the government. 
The mining companies did not dispute the fact that the Development Agreements they signed 
with the Zambian government were extremely favourable and that the investment climate in the 
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country is generous.249 The mines stood to make huge profits from the sale of copper, with the 
global prices being high. 
The tax concessions in the Development Agreements  partly reflect the fact that the  principal  
objective of  privatisation , which was creating an attractive or favourable investment climate to 
bring in new capital in the country was prioritized above ensuring that new investors accepted 
responsibilities to share in the wealth that would flow  from their operations.250 These 
concessions can be attributable to the weak bargaining position Zambian negotiators found 
themselves in.  
 
Did the creation of a favourable investment climate, to the point where there was departure from 
the law, actually bring in more foreign direct investment in the mining sector? It can be said that 
privatisation of copper mines brought in more foreign direct investment in the sector. The 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Mines stated; 
“It has been very, very successful. Closed mines have opened up, new mines are coming up, and 
the existing mines which were limping are all doing very well.” 251 
 
Undoubtedly, the increased mining activities have brought increased profits to mining 
companies given the high copper prices on the world market and the favourable investment 
climate in Zambia. Foreign investors have arrived on the scene to either buy former state 
mining companies, now privatised, or to start new mining operations.252 
Before foreign investors bought the mines, most mines had ceased operations, laid off a number 
of its workforce and only maintained a skeleton staff. Foreign investors put up financial 
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165 , Institute for Security Studies 
 
 
 
 
‐ 46 ‐ 
 
investments, as part of the commitments they had undertaken in the Share Sale Agreements, to 
refurbish the mines. This extended the mines lives and offered hope of jobs to former miners.253 
Under ZCCM, facing historically low global copper prices, there was an acute shortage of 
investment with the possibility that mines would close.  It was recognised then, that despite the 
importance of the industry, it did not make any sense for the government to continue subsidizing 
loss making entities to the tune of US$ 1 million per day at a time when the government was 
itself facing serious financial difficulties and a huge external debt in excess of US$ 7 billion.254 
Significant investment has now been delivered, re-invigorating the industry and increasing 
production.255 
It was projected that with new mines coming on stream in 2008 (Lumwana and Muliashi) and 
the completion of the expansion programme at Konkola Deep Mining Project (KDMP), copper 
production would reach 800,000 tonnes in 2007 and 1,000,000 tonnes in 2009.256 There is no 
doubt that these new developments will bring increased profits to mining companies given the 
high copper prices on the world market and the favourable investment environment in Zambia. 
While the projections to open new mines have actually come to fruition, the projections 
concerning the rate of production to be achieved for 2009 are very doubtful. Not only have 
copper prices on the world market fallen again, with the world economic crisis being 
experienced, some mining operations have been closed due to the increased cost in running 
them. 
 
The performance of the mining industry, which was in a slump from the mid-1970s, has 
greatly improved since 2004.257 For example, the contribution of mining to gross domestic 
product (GDP) increased from 6.2% in 2000 to 11.8% in 2005.258 Zambia’s copper production 
also increased by 7.1% in 2006 as a result of increased investment in the mining sector. 
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259Copper output increased from 459,324 tonnes in 2005 to 492,016 tonnes in 2006,260with a 
target for 2007 of 600,000 tonnes.261 Production had previously declined from a high of 
750,000 tonnes in 1976 to a low of 368,000 tonnes in the mid-1990s, the lowest being 257,000 
tonnes in 2000. 262 
  
Copper production drastically declined between 1994 and 2000 and only picked up after the 
completion of privatisation.263 
 
 
3.5 Impact of Privatisation on  the Economy 
 
Since 1991 the government of Zambia has been pursuing liberal economic policies. Important to 
this policy framework has been embarking on a very rigid, rapid and far-reaching structural 
adjustment programme. This strategy (supported by IMF and World Bank) was a dramatic shift 
from the previous government controlled approach to economic management. 264 
At the heart of the new order of economic management has been, inter alia, trade liberalisation, 
removal of foreign exchange controls, public service reform, introduction of cost sharing 
(arrangement where both government and citizens share the responsibilities of meeting the costs) 
with respect to the social sectors -- education and health, the heralded privatisation programme -- 
government withdrawal in running business. Privatisation has tended to stand out as the major 
driving force for economic development.  
The private sector-driven economic approach went with the emphasis on calling foreign 
investors. One undeniable fact is that Zambia has not only structurally adjusted its economy as 
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shown above over the past decade but has also tried to make itself an attractive destination for 
FDI by improving the standards of treatment given to foreign firms.   
 
However, while the privatised mines have recorded large profits, the Zambian government 
acknowledges that revenue from copper as a proportion of government income has been very 
low.265 This is indeed not surprising seeing the concessions that the government had given the 
mine owners in the Development Agreements. Royalty which is prescribed at 3 percent by the 
Mines and Minerals Act is being charged at 0.6 percent. This is in effect revenue forgone by 
the Zambian government, a subsidy to the mine owners. The tax concessions which were 
granted for periods ranging between 10 to 15 years also contribute to the low revenue being 
received by government. For the period 2002–2006, Zambia received about US$752 million in 
various taxes from foreign investors holding large-scale mining licences.266 It is believed that 
government earned about US$70 million from total copper sales of US$3 billion.  
 
Debt forgiveness, which saw Zambia’s US$7.2 billion foreign debt reduced to around $500 
million in 2005, combined with improved copper prices on the world market, raised a concern 
that the country should exact a fair share from the mining companies’ profits by reviewing the 
Development Agreements.267 While the copper price was as low as $0.70 per pound at the 
time of privatisation, it increased to US$7.75 per pound in 2006. As a result, mining 
companies have recorded astronomical profits since 2004. For example, records of the 
performance of two of Zambia’s largest copper mining companies, namely Konkola Copper 
Mines (KCM), which is owned by United Kingdom-based Vedanta, and First Quantum 
Minerals, reveals that KCM’s profits increased from $52.7 million in 2005 to $206.3 million 
in 2006, while First Quantum’s profits shot up from $4.6 million in 2003 to $152.8 million in 
2005. 268 
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It is very clear that there has been little economic development flowing out of the privatisation 
of the mines. There is no doubt that mining has both a positive and negative impact on the 
local economy.269 New mining activities have the potential to stimulate economic 
activities through sub-contracting services and supplying goods.270 It can be stated for Zambia, 
from the various literature that spillovers from FDI are not inevitable.271 The right conditions 
need to exist. First, for positive spillovers to occur there has to be a smaller technological gap 
between domestic and FDI firms.272 It therefore follows that FDI will not generate the 
spillovers unless it is placed within a broader economic policy context. Investment in basic 
infrastructure, education and training, and encouragement of Zambian firms to invest in 
technological development becomes crucial.273 These policies will do a great deal in 
increasing Zambian firms’ technological capability, and hence make it easier for the nation to 
benefit from spillovers.274 
 
Secondly, there needs to be an institutional framework that prevents state capture from 
domestic firms.275 Influence-peddling in Zambia has affected industrial competition and 
ultimately productivity.276 If domestic firms can be prevented from influence-peddling and be 
subjected to more competition, they may be more willing to go into partnership with foreign 
firms.277 
 
In essence, Zambia has followed the classical theory on Foreign Direct Investment which 
reduced to its basic form, marks a shift from earlier doctrinal objections held by many 
developing countries on the role played by the multinational corporations in their economies, 
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which saw justification for the expropriation/nationalisation of foreign companies or assets. 278 
The expropriation/ nationalisation of MNCs by many developing countries particularly during 
the early days of their independence symbolized a rejection by these countries of being 
externally dependant upon foreigners.279 This hostility has largely waned with many countries 
realising and recognizing that positive economic gains can be achieved from the presence of 
FDI.280 The slow down of growth in the world economy, change in political leadership, and 
the scarcity of financial capital in the wake of the debt crisis of the early 1980’s has 
contributed to this change in attitude. Most governments have or are promulgating laws or 
regulations that are investor friendly. In broad terms classical theorists advance the claim that 
FDI and MNCs contribute to the economic development of host countries through a number of 
channels which include transfer of capital, advanced technology equipment and skills, 
improvement in the balance of payments, the expansion of the tax base and foreign exchange, 
the creation of employment, infrastructure development and the integration of the host 
economy into international markets.281 The benefits from FDI are derived through positive 
spillovers, as illustrated above. MNCs provide information relating to new technologies, new 
markets, new customers and management techniques from which domestic firms benefit, 282 
making them more productive, competitive and efficient.283   
 
Although the classical theory seems to paint an overwhelmingly positive picture about the 
benefits that can be derived from FDI, empirical evidence on the subject is mixed. Some 
studies have found a positive spill over effect, some no effect and others a negative spill over 
effect. For instance whilst Todaro284 finds that FDI helps in accumulating foreign exchange 
and hence contributes to the country’s balance of payment, Sharan285 observed that between 
the period 1964-1971, FDI had a negative impact on India’s balance of payment. A study 
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carried out by the Research and Information System (RIS) for the non- aligned and other 
developing countries based in India has found the evidence of the effect of FDI on domestic 
investments to be mixed.286 In some countries it was found that FDI crowded out domestic 
investment, while in others, FDI flows appeared not to have any effect on domestic 
investment, while yet in others, FDI was noted to have effect by bringing in domestic 
investment.287 The existence of conflicting empirical evidence on the impact of FDI does not 
imply that there are no benefits to be derived from FDI. What the evidence points to is in fact 
that the benefits derived from FDI are dependant on the existence or absence of certain factors. 
  
A number of scholars in acknowledging the importance of FDI and its welfare contribution to 
the host economy share the view that the benefits derived from FDI depend on the existence of 
a number of factors.288 These factors range from the economic policies pursued by the host 
state, the sectors in which investment is made, the political risks present, availability of 
effective institutions and the presence of developed financial markets, to the stock of  skilled 
human capital availability. These factors constitute what is called the absorptive capacity of 
the host state.289  Nevertheless, as much as FDI can be a source of good, it can also be a source 
of economic harm. FDI may contribute to underdevelopment if the profits are not reinvested in 
the host country. The view that the growth impact of FDI depends on the characteristics of the 
country in which FDI takes place is widespread.290  The benefits derived from FDI depend on 
whether the host country environment is conducive to the overall investment, economic 
spillovers and income growth. Unless there are developed local markets and institutions, 
investment- friendly policies and administrative framework, as well as complementary factors 
of production, there will be modest gains from FDI.291 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, it is thus, not surprising that despite the notable increased FDI to the mining 
sector, which is the driving force of Zambia’s economy, this has not translated into real 
economic growth for the country as most of these factors are clearly non- existent.  Zambia 
has concentrated more on creating a favourable investment climate while neglecting the other 
factors that would increase its absorptive capacity. The economy is still centered on mining 
despite its demonstrated cyclical nature. The economy is not diversified and manufacturing is 
non existent. There is no proper allocation of the little resources that are derived from the 
increased activity in the copper mining. While some reforms have been adopted, 
recommendations of the World Bank/IMF such as fiscal discipline, tax reform, interest rate 
liberalisation, a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalisation, a reduction of public 
expenditure, deregulation, these must be followed through. These reforms require the state, 
beyond its provision of the necessary market institutions, to play a minimal role in the market.  
The state and market should provide a check on and facilitate the functioning of the other. 
Unless FDI is aligned with the development objective of host countries, there will be no added 
value in having FDI. 
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Chapter 4 
 
4.Introduction 
This Chapter analyses the Mining Development Agreements, both the previous and re-negotiated 
Agreements vis-à-vis the tax provisions and incentives granted by the government, and whether 
incentives on their own can attract FDI and benefit the host country. It will look at the calls for 
the introduction of a mining windfall tax and whether the introduction of the windfall mining tax 
is a once off event which can lead to economic growth. 
Many Developing countries anxious to bring in big business to develop their natural resources 
have found themselves in a “race to the bottom” in terms of offering financial inducements.  
Countries compete with each other in offering to slash taxes and royalty rates where appropriate, 
to win the necessary investment.292 
One of the arguments in favour of privatisation was that it would save the government money by 
relieving them from propping up an enterprise losing up to US$1 million a day.293 It would also 
generate resources: increased investments by the new owners would generate significant profits 
that would be channeled back to the government through taxation and dividends. 
 
Although this has happened to some extent, evidence from a variety of reports suggests that the 
amount of revenue transferred to the Zambian government by the new mining companies is 
relatively small when compared to the revenues transferred to governments in other resource-rich 
countries like Botswana or Chile.294 
It is widely believed that Zambia was placed under considerable pressure, by calls from the 
World Bank and IMF to quickly privatise the mines and at some point, Privatisation of ZCCM 
was a condition repeatedly attached to several loans from both these institutions and was a pre-
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condition for Zambia to qualify for debt relief through the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) 
initiative.295 This severely weakened its bargaining position, leaving it unable to replicate models 
that had been successfully applied elsewhere – in Botswana, for example, as mentioned above. 
As a result, various mining companies locked the government into 15-20 year contracts that, 
allow the exploitation of its key natural resource on unfavourable terms.296 
While the incentives cited in the previous Chapter were put in place to attract FDI, these, in 
reality work against the host country, such as have happened in Zambia. It is therefore, important 
for the host country to look at the long term benefits to the country and not just at attracting FDI.  
The major problem being that these companies know better than governments what the rights are 
worth, and take advantage to negotiate better deals for themselves. The following is an analysis 
of the various incentives granted by the government and how they affect the economy. 
4.1Analysing Development Agreements 
 
Mineral royalties provide a starting point. Royalties are payments to governments of a fixed 
percentage of whatever value is being extracted.297 Given the high quality of Zambia’s copper 
deposits, the high rate of extraction, and the country’s dependence on copper, the Zambian 
government should be able to charge a relatively high rate of mineral royalty. An International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) survey in 2001 found royalty rates  in developing countries vary from 2 to 
30 per cent, with most between 5 and 10 per cent.298 Zambia’s Mines and Minerals Act specifies 
a royalty rate of just 3 per cent of the netback value of minerals produced.299 
 
IMF and World Bank pressure on Zambia to privatise its copper-mining industry at the end of 
the 1990s led to the setting of what is believed to be one of the lowest royalty rates ever 
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charged: 0.6 per cent.300 
 
Then Minister of Finance, Ngandu Magande argued that the government was reluctant to 
increase tax as it was seen that investors would take their investments elsewhere. He argues that 
investors were to be given more time as they were still paying off the loans they had borrowed 
from outside and also in the process of setting up the mines.301 He seems to believe that taxing 
companies would lead them to re-invest less of their profits, and thus in the long-term create 
fewer jobs.302  It can in fact be argued that companies will stay in Zambia, and will borrow to 
cover investments if they expect to benefit in the future, so long as they expect the price to show 
some stability - taxing will reduce their profits, but have marginal effects on their investment 
decisions.303 Price variations massively outweigh such a consideration (3% royalty rate) in 
calculating profits. Another way of thinking about it is that 'production' in mining describes the 
pace of removal of a non-renewable resource from the nation's stock of natural capital - the 
longer you wait to tax production, the less there is in the end to tax.304  
 
Moreover, OECD guidelines, standards for company behaviour signed up to by OECD member 
governments, expressly state that ‘enterprises should refrain from seeking or accepting 
exemptions not contemplated in the statutory or regulatory framework related to taxation, 
financial incentives or other issues.’305 
 
Another example of such incentives is the rate of corporate income tax. While KCM’s corporate 
income tax rate is set at 25 per cent, there are several exemptions and allowances – for instance, 
an extended carry-over loss period – which can lead to the headline rate not being paid in 
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practice. While it is standard practice to allow losses to be carried over and offset against future 
profits, the net effect of this and other tax exemptions, according to the World Bank’s 
International Finance Corporation,306 is that mining companies in Zambia can legally enjoy a 
marginal effective tax rate 307of 0 per cent. It is therefore, more practical to obtain revenues by 
imposing royalty on market value of the company’s production. Profit taxes on the other hand, 
are more difficult to collect because profit figures can be easily manipulated. In Zambia it has 
been difficult to obtain data from the mining companies either on profits made or production.308  
Operating across many tax jurisdictions, there is a tendency to reduce revenues or inflate 
expenditure deductions in order to minimize the tax liability in a particular country.309  It is also 
normal  that in addition to income tax, companies may pay with holding tax on dividends., often 
only when these are distributed to non- residents.  However, some countries compensate for a 
higher tax rate on mineral extraction by exempting the distribution of dividends from 
withholding tax.310 
 
Price participation as an investment incentive constitutes a separate contract in its own right. If 
the price of copper at the London Metal Exchange (LME) exceeds a specific benchmark 
(US$2,700-2,800 per tonne), then the government, via ZCCM-IH, an investment holdings 
company through which the government owns shares in the mines, starts to claim back a certain 
percentage (in KCM’s case, 25 per cent) of the difference between the benchmark price and the 
current price.311 Zambia rarely receives the full percentage as ‘there are conditionalities attached, 
and a cap on the amount that ZCCM can receive from KCM in any one year (roughly US$16-19 
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million).Reports from the defunct Zambia Privatisation Agency also note that there is a cap of 
US$125 million on how much ZCCM can receive ‘over the life of the operations.’ 312 
Price Participation in itself is a good principle except in the Zambian scenario, the amount 
government receives is pathetic. The high percentage of profits retained by KCM impacts 
negatively on the amount the Zambian government is currently receiving in dividends. Press 
reports suggest that ZCCM received nothing in dividends from KCM between 2003 and 2005, 
and to date has only received US$2.3 million for 2006 and 2007.313 
However, the Zambian government urgently needs funds to finance its five-year National 
Development Plan, (for the period 2006 – 2011) whose funds are realized from exports and 
taxes. Increased dividends – and increased revenue transfers from the copper mining sector more 
generally – could be one way of filling this gap without the government having to resort to 
increased borrowing or reliance on aid.  
Estimates in a KCM presentation to investors suggest that employee’ contributions through ‘pay 
as you earn’ (PAYE) account for nearly half of KCM’s tax contributions to the government.314 
Meanwhile, KCM’s reported net profits in financial year 2006/07 were US$301 million.315 
While the state holds, 20.6 percent in Vedanta's Konkola Copper Mine, a 10 percent stake in 
First Quantum's Kansanshi open pit mine and similar stakes in Mopani and others, these are 
relatively small crumbs from the bounteous bread basket that has been copper income during the 
commodity boom.316 Clearly, in one sense, Zambia might not have much of a mining industry 
today were it not for the investment from the foreign mining houses. 
There are other models to observe which show that countries can offer incentives and create a 
favourable investment climate while at the same time, gaining from the foreign Direct 
                                                            
312 Zambia Development Agency (Formerly Zambia Privatisation Agency) Privatisation Transaction Summary 
Sheets 1992-2005, 2005. 
313Dymond Abi 2007 Undermining Development: Copper Mining In Zambia A Report conducted  by Action for 
Southern Africa (ACTSA) Christian Aid UK and SCIAF. Available at www.christiaaid.org accessed 16.01.08 
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316Lipmann Anthony 2008  Can resource-rich Zambia keep more wealth?, Reuters, Commentary  ( 
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Investment that comes into the country -- KGHM in Poland is still more than 50 percent 
government-owned and Codelco in Chile, the state-owned copper miner, is still the main source 
of that country's wealth through the taxes that it pays for copper mining.317 
Zero rating of customs and excise duties on all consumable items imported during the period up 
to the value of US$16,000,000 for the first 12 months up to US$10,000,000 for three years is 
another such incentive which can have a negative effect. This treatment is extended to companies 
that supply equipment to mining companies. In principle, mining companies should be treated 
similarly to other economic activities with regard to duties.  In practice mining companies are 
treated differently as special incentives are offered to investors in the mining sector. Without 
special treatment of imports, these would be an attractive way for the government to secure an 
up-front revenue stream.318 Given the very substantial import needs during project development, 
this revenue is typically even more front loaded than royalty payments. 
 
 Other such mining incentives include refunding mine owners Value Added Tax (VAT) within 
30 days from the date of submission of the Companies monthly returns.  As stated earlier, mining 
companies negotiated to pay a lower corporate tax.  Government undertook to refund VAT that 
companies pay on goods that it buys locally, since the company from which these goods were 
initially bought will have paid the VAT aspect of the price charged to the Government, and the 
government then pays that back to the purchaser. VAT contributions are reflected as a minus or 
negative figure, in effect, a subsidy from Government to the mines.319  Mining companies in 
developing countries more often than not, export, if not all, most of their output. Combined with 
the very large investment needs, this can complicate the treatment for VAT purposes.320  Where 
the mining operations are in a constant refund position, it is important to note the magnitude of 
the VAT refunds, which can be substantial especially in the investment period.321 It is this refund 
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319  Fraser Alistair and Lungu John  2007 For Whom the Windfall? Winners and Losers in the Privatisation of 
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problem that leads countries to choose to exempt from VAT all imported capital goods and 
inputs for mineral extraction. 
 
Government undertook not to amend any of these tax regimes after the Development 
Agreements was completed, for a period of 20 years or more. This would be in the Stability 
Period in which until the Development Agreement expires the terms of the Agreements are 
legally binding. While this to the government can seem attractive and in the short run, an 
inexpensive way of minimising investor risk, in the long run, it may have costs by limiting the 
governments flexibility to set tax policy.322 This can result in large revenue loss and increased 
administrative costs.  While it is appreciated that the inclusion of such clauses is to guard against 
unforeseen changes to the financial premises of the project, especially as regards the fiscal 
framework, it should be also be appreciated that risk will affect both the investor and the 
government. While the traditional view has been that the investor is risk averse whereas the 
government is risk neutral, this is unlikely to be the case in many developing countries.323 There 
are clearly limits as to how much risk it would be prudent for a small mineral rich country to 
carry.  A tax will have an impact on investor risk in terms of the perception of fiscal stability and 
how it affects commercial risk. 324While the investor’s perception of fiscal stability depends on a 
country’s political and economic track record, a specific concern is that the fiscal terms may 
change during the life of the project. This concern may be partially accommodated through 
appropriate policy designs. If a project turns out to be very profitable, it is more likely that the 
government will seek renegotiations to increase the government take; the investor may likewise 
put pressure on the government to renegotiate in cases where a project turns out to be less 
profitable than expected.325 
Further, no agreement can take away the sovereign right of any country to legislate in the public 
interest and these taxes fall within that right.326 The change in the tax regime by the Zambian 
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government should as such not be seen as a renegation of their undertakings under the 
Development Agreements.   
Since 2005 when copper prices on the market increased, the Zambian government has hesitated 
in talking the bold move of amending the tax regime. However, despite the fact that the 
government set up a negotiating team to start the process of negotiating the Development 
Agreements with the mining companies, this never came to be.327  It has been alleged that 
Zambia has lost $2 billion dollars (K8 trillion) as a result of delayed taxation on the mines.328 
The government had been too slow in increasing taxation on the mines which resulted in the 
country losing out. The right time to have introduced the new tax regime was in 2005 when the 
copper prices went up. 
 
Because of the changed economic conditions, civil society and the opposition political parties in 
Zambia mounted pressure on the government to re-negotiate the Development Agreements.329 
The pressure did not only come from institutions within the country. There was pressure from 
other international non-governmental organisations such as the Scottish Catholic International 
Aid Fund (SCIAF), Christian Aid and Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA). 
In a surprising twist of events, the World Bank and IMF supported the call to renegotiate the 
Development Agreements. Visiting IMF alternate Executive Director Miranda Xafa leading a 
team of directors on a study of the economic performance in Zambia was quoted as saying the 
new tax changes were in order, adding that before the government introduced changes in the 
mine taxes, Zambia was the lowest taxing country.330   While the World Bank has expressed its 
support for the move, calling the new fiscal regime more equitable, critiques counter that the 
Bank was responsible for insisting on rock bottom tax rates in 1998 that have deprived the 
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government of much needed revenue as copper prices soared.331 The government instead, armed 
with massive support from the non-governmental organisations and civil society in general 
decided that it would be a waste of time to engage in re-negotiating and instead made a unilateral 
decision to change the fiscal regime affecting the mining companies in the 2008 budget.332 
 
In setting the scene for the shape and design of the new fiscal regime, the government focused on 
a key objective in nearly all existing development agreements that had been entered into with the 
mining companies: to “ secure maximum benefits  for the Zambian people and an appropriate 
return on investment for the mining companies”333  
 
4.2 Proposed fiscal changes 
The following changes to the tax laws were made:334 
 
a) Increasing the corporate income tax from the current 25 percent to 30 percent (payable after 
     deducting costs and royalties). 
 
b) Increasing the mineral royalty tax from the current 0.6 percent to 3 percent. This is the 
    statutory prescribed rate of taxation.  
 
c)  Introducing a withholding tax on interest, royalties, management fees and payments to 
    affiliates or sub-contactors in the mining sector at 15 percent 
 
d)  Introducing a variable profit tax of up to 15 percent on taxable income which is 
     above 8 percent of gross income. This means that in addition to the 30 percent corporate tax,    
     companies will also pay an extra 15 per cent. This is likely to happen as a result of the boom 
                                                            
331 Zambia to revise “unfair and unbalanced” mining tax rates set by World Bank 2008 Agence France Press 
available at www.bicusa.org/en/Article.3672.aspx accessed 8:03;09 
332 Lungu John  2008 Copper Mining Agreements in Zambia: Renegotiation or Law Reform. Review  of African 
political Economy, Vol. 35 Issue 3 
333 Chipimo Elias 2008 Taxing the Mining Sector,  available at www.iflr1000.com/LegislationGuide/150/Taxing-
the-  
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     in commodity prices. This tax transfers a share of the windfall profit of copper to the Zambian 
     government. 
 
e)  Introducing a windfall tax to be triggered at different price levels for different base metals. A   
    windfall tax will be charged on the sales value of copper for every 50 cents increase in the     
    price of copper per pound on international copper exchanges .The windfall tax will be 25   
    percent when the copper price is between $2.50 to $3.00 per pound or $2500 to 3000 per 
    tonne; 50 percent when the price is between $3.00 and $3.50 and 75 percent when the price 
   exceeds $3.50. This could push the sales tax on copper up to over 5 percent.335 
 
f) Capital allowances which are currently at 100 percent will now be 25 percent. Capital 
   expenditures for new projects shall be ring fenced and only become deductible when the 
   projects start production 
 
g) The reference price on which these taxes will be based will be the price tenable at 
    the London Metal exchange, Metal Bulletin or any other metal exchange market 
    recognised by the Commissioner General of taxes. 
 
 
Despite the government’s decision to change the tax regime, the mining companies are resisting 
paying the taxes, especially the windfall tax. Most mining companies have argued that 
government needed to consider the impact of the new tax regime on investors.336 Mine owners 
had hoped to recuperate the investment they are putting in before the majority of Zambians 
would start seeing meaningful benefits from the projects.337 The main concern about the changes 
to the law is that the existing Development Agreements would no longer be binding on the 
Republic. A clause in the amended  Acts provides " Notwithstanding any provision to the 
contrary contained in any law or in any development agreement between the government and a 
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mining company which is in existence at the commencement  of this Act, the development 
Agreement shall  cease to be binding on the Republic from the commencement of this Act.”338 
 
The issue of the binding nature of the Development Agreements pauses a problem. Government 
appears to have reached a compromise to effect changes to the law without being seen to have 
overtly cancelled these agreements. Stating that the agreements will not be binding on the 
Republic means that the agreements may not necessarily be cancelled but will , in theory at least, 
allow the government to introduce changes to the law solely to overcome the Stability provisions 
contained in the Agreements.339  This is a breach of the terms of the Agreement and could reflect 
upon the country’s capacity to uphold their end of the deal. As such, a possible and equitable 
remedy for the mining companies is compensation for breach of the Agreement. 
 
The changes to the tax regime received mixed reactions from the mining owners with others 
threatening legal action against the government if it implemented the new law that increased 
higher taxes in the sector.340  Making a presentation before a parliamentary watchdog committee, 
the Chamber of Mines, a cartel of mining firms operating in Zambia, painted a picture of doom 
and gloom, warning of an economic recession with obvious consequences of rising 
unemployment, poverty and a serious damage to Zambia’s reputation as a favoured destination 
for foreign direct investment (FDI).341 The mining companies furher argued that the new 
measures were going to make mining unsustainable.342 They counter proposed that while they 
where agreeable to the royalty rate being raised to 3 percent, this still needed to be graduated 
from 1 to 3 percent.343 How this was going to be applied has not been explained. The mining 
companies also objected to the 25 percent windfall tax in preference for 12.5 percent.344 They 
also made it very clear to the parliamentary committee on estimates and revenue that they would 
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339 Chipimo Elias 2008 Taxing the Mining Sector,  available at www.iflr1000.com/LegislationGuide/150/Taxing-
the-mining-sector.html                                                                                                                                                                                   
340 Mine owners threaten to sue Government, Zambia Daily Mail, 2008 
341 Ibid  
342 Lungu John 2008 Copper Mining Agreements in Zambia: Renegotiation or Law Reform. Review  of African 
Political Economy, Vol. 35 Issue 3 
343 Ibid 
344 Ibid 
 
 
 
 
‐ 64 ‐ 
 
only accept the introduction of the windfall tax or the variable tax and not both. 345They further 
objected to the reduced capital allowance in preference for the status quo. This they stated would 
maintain the viability of mining investments and also maintain the ability of the companies to 
fund further investments. 346 
 
By September 2008, only two mining companies had paid the windfall taxes for the quarter 
ending 30th June 2008.347 Government however, refused to re-negotiate the Agreements.  
 
4.3  Windfall taxes: The Justification 
A windfall tax is a one-off tax based on historical profits and not on the current and anticipated 
profits.348 The goal of a windfall tax is to retrospectively claw back some of those benefits 
received by the owners of the companies concerned and, in so doing, raise the revenue needed to 
finance a welfare-to-work scheme.349 
 
Regular fiscal measures such as royalties, or resource rent taxes are often implemented when the 
generation of economic rent,350 is expected. However, at times circumstances arise unexpectedly 
leading to the unanticipated generation of economic rent at the expense of consumers or society, 
in the absence of appropriate fiscal measures.351 For instance, this can occur as a result of 
unanticipated large changes in commodity prices, unexpected emergence of market power, or 
unexpected regulatory failure. These gains are referred to as windfall profits.  Windfall profits 
are unexpected, occurring because of circumstances that were not foreseen at the time when 
existing fiscal and regulatory regimes were established.352 
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When the price of copper rose on the world market, mining companies were only expected to 
pay taxes that had been negotiated. The regulatory framework was inadequate to deal with these 
unexpected high prices, while the government and country did not benefit from the rise in prices. 
As a way of capturing these unexpected profits, government imposed a windfall tax. 
 
With increased investments in the sector coupled with current attractive copper prices on the 
international markets, copper is set to be firm for a while. 353 According to Economics 
Association of Zambia (EAZ) review for the 2006, the price of copper sharply increased 
reaching historical levels of US$8,000 per metric tonne by May 2006.354  EAZ is of the view that 
the Zambian economy and ordinary Zambians did not directly benefit from these high copper 
prices. For instance, the EAZ points out that while Zambia exported about 30,000 tonnes of 
copper in one month at $7,500 per tonne giving an income of about $225 million in a month or 
$56.25 million a week, only $8 million was available on the market locally for ordinary 
Zambians to purchase, while $48.25 million ended up outside the country.355 It is such a scenario 
which has led some experts to suggest the imposition of windfall profit taxes on mining 
companies. Others have pointed out that windfall taxes were the country’s practical solution of 
benefiting from strong copper prices.356 Some economists have supported the call for the 
introduction of the tax as a way of improving the export earnings base for the country, stating 
that the current lucrative copper prices on the international market would not last for a long time 
and that the introduction of windfall taxes could enable the country to raise more revenue.357 
From an economic standpoint, the strongest argument for a windfall tax is that it has the potential 
to be non-distortionary.358 A one-off windfall tax levied on past profits should not change firms’ 
behaviour, since it does not affect future costs and prices.359 
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Others have argued that the windfall tax is inadvisable for other reasons too. Perhaps the most 
significant is that it would be counter-productive for the long term national interest.360 A windfall 
levy would produce revenue for a cash-strapped Treasury, but it would send a dangerous 
message to the copper production sector.361 Producers need consistent tax signals from 
governments if they are to invest in long-term projects in a rational manner.362 
 
Infrastructure and essential service industries where market power is potentially a problem are 
generally subject to specific policy or regulatory measures that are based on, and appropriate to, 
a range of expectations about future contingencies.363 In the event that future outcomes fall 
outside of the range of expected scenarios it will often be considered that some form of 
intervention is required as circumstances have moved beyond what was ordinarily anticipated. 
364The same argument applies to natural resource extraction industries when existing fiscal 
regimes did not anticipate the levels of resource rents that arose. The terms “windfall profits” and 
“windfall taxes”, as used in this paper, envisages an unexpected situation that occurred in the 
past, and which might still exist in the present.365 This is essentially a backward looking 
perspective that employs retrospective fiscal measures. However, when changed conditions and 
recognition of the existence of windfall profits create an expectation of sustained economic rent 
in future, longer-term forward looking fiscal measures could be implemented (or existing ones 
adjusted) as required.366 
 
 4.4 Scope of the tax 
 
Basically, in countries such as the UK where this has been used by the government, a windfall 
tax is a one-off tax on the excess profits of a company often applied against the assumption that 
excess profits have arisen because, in the case of privatised companies, such firms have been 
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sold off too cheaply and regulated too lightly thereby enabling them to exploit their market 
power.367 In Zambia, the same could be said of the privatised mines. At the time of privatisation, 
the companies where sold cheaply due to the state they were in and also, due to the low copper 
prices on the world market. These privatised companies have also been regulated too lightly, 
with reduced taxes , undeclared profits or production.  
 
These elements encapsulate the arguments behind the tax. They are intimately related, since if 
regulation had been stricter in the years immediately following privatisation, the initial prices 
paid would have turned out to be a better reflection of the value of those mines.368 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
It was estimated that the tax is expected to raise US$400million from the affected companies 
every year.369 
 
While it was the intention of the Government to raise funds from revenue collected from the 
mining windfall tax, as articulated in Chapter 1, copper is a cyclical product, with periods of high 
and low prices. In late 2008 the prices of copper on the world market declined to such a level that 
it was uneconomical to operate the mines.   Some mines were closed down, while others slowed 
down operations and laid off most of their workers. The decline coincided with the change in the 
tax regime.  On 28th March 2009, Zambia’s parliament agreed to abolish the controversial 25 per 
cent windfall tax to cushion the copper mining companies from the weak metal prices from the 
global financial crisis.370 
 
It has been argued by most economists that the best time to have imposed the mining windfall 
tax was in 2005, when the prices of copper on the world market increased.371 Because copper is a 
cyclical product, the government should have acted fast to capture the windfall profits. Zambia 
lost an opportunity to benefit from the high copper prices and it remains to be seen whether, the 
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country will see some benefit from the increased levels of taxation despite the removal of the 
windfall tax. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion it can be said that incentives, especially tax incentives continue to form a larger 
part of policies for FDI promotion in Zambia. The rationale for using incentives is derived from 
the belief that they help compensate for a country’s negative investment climate in terms of 
physical and human infrastructure, poor macroeconomic policies, and general investment 
regulatory framework not in favour of FDI.372 Although tax incentives continue to dominate 
developing countries’ efforts of attracting FDI, they have been largely challenged by policy 
makers, economists and academics for not being effective and efficient means of attracting FDI.   
It has been argued that factors such as outlined above are more important in attracting FDI.373 
What is evident from the analysis of the incentives granted to mining companies in Zambia is 
that tax incentives have high revenue costs to developing countries considering the desperate 
demand for revenue in their budgets.374 Granting tax incentives means that a country has to 
forego some or all of the revenue which is due to the country.375  The host country must strike a 
balance; if the benefits of FDI do not outweigh the costs of revenue foregone then the whole 
investment issue becomes nothing but a drain of the country’s resources. 376 The lesson that can 
be learnt from the above discussion is that competition amongst developing countries for FDI by 
using tax incentives represents a race to the bottom scenario.377 Countries are increasingly 
competing to grant more and more generous tax incentives that in the end leaves no benefit to the 
country as one would have expected.  
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Chapter 5 
5 Historical Background of Copper Mining In Chile 
This Chapter is a comparative analysis of the Chilean implementation of the windfall profits   as 
a solution to capture the boom in the copper prices over the years, and how this has been 
implemented and utilized. 
 Copper mining has long been the mainstay of Chilean exports and at present, it accounts for 
almost a third of all foreign trade.378Chile is the largest world producer of copper.379 In 1996, 
Chile produced 28% of the world’s copper. The copper belt in Chile is the largest and highest 
grade deposit in the world. This copper belt shared with Argentina and Peru contains 30 per cent 
of the world’s identified copper reserves.380The major mines and processing plants are in the 
northern half of the country. The copper belt and the Solar de Atacama are the sites of the most 
mining activity in Chile. As of 1996, Chile contained 32 either privately or publicly, that is, state 
owned mines whose primary product is copper. CODELCO or the state owned corporation 
currently produces 48 per cent of Chile’s copper.381  Its largest mine is El Chiquicamata or 
Chiqui located at an elevation of 2700 meters and is 1200 kilometers north of Santiago making it 
the northern most CODELCO mine.382 
 
The mining industry especially copper is very important to Chile’s GNP, exports, foreign 
exchange and ability to obtain foreign investment.383 In 1995, mining contributed 8 percent of 
Chilean GNP with copper contributing about 7 percent of that total.384 Copper constituted 82 per 
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cent of mining exports with total value at US$6,500,000. 385 Historically, from 1974 – 1995, 
mining has attracted 56 percent of total foreign investment in the Chilean economy.386 
Between the 1850’s and 1880’s Chile became the largest  copper producer and exporter in the 
world but production more than halved by the end of the century as  the nitrate industry 
boomed.387  This was due to several factors including the depletion of the higher grade veins, 
competition with the nitrate producers for both shipping space and coal supplies and the 
generally antiquated methods used by the copper industry.388 This changed at the beginning of 
the 20th Century with the entrance of mainly American capital and the development of methods 
to treat the massive low grade copper deposits that had become the mainstay of the industry.389 
 
Chilean copper production has tripled since 1977, going from 1.03 million metric tonnes per year 
in 1977 to 3.1 million tones in 1997.390 In the year 2000, production increased to over 4 million 
metric tonnes.391  Roughly, 50 per cent of copper production is by state companies CODELCO 
and ENAMI while the other half is produced by foreign companies and small domestic and 
medium size businesses.392 
Copper production at CODELCO dropped from 83 per cent to 48 per cent from 1981 to 1999. 
393This was due to government’s strong push for privatisatisation and foreign investment as well 
as the hegemony of neo- liberal ideology in Chile.394 Chile has made significant progress in the 
refining of copper, domestically, increasing its refined out put from 64 per cent in 1977 to nearly 
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85 per cent in 1999.395 The government remains the dominant player in the mineral and copper 
industry. It controls the copper mining by ownership of copper producing companies, processing 
facilities, by developing laws as well as marketing. 396 The complete nationalisation of the mines 
took place under the left wing Unidad popular government.   It involved three huge mines known 
as “La Gran Minera” and three smaller operations.397 The Chilean owned small companies were 
not affected. Nationalisation took place through constitutional amendment. The state became the 
sole owner of all mineral deposits in Chile. Nationalisation was part of the strategy of achieving 
political independence through economic independence. This was carried out against the wishes 
of the companies. The United States of America responded by cutting Chile off from credit and 
setting up an unofficial trade blockade making it difficult for Chile to import the necessary 
capital goods for mines while various other forms of retaliation such as sabotage were carried out 
by the companies and their right wing supporters in Chile.398 
Since the coup in 1973, Chilean mining law and policy has been re-oriented towards attracting 
foreign capital and reducing the role of the state in mining activity as well as the economy as a 
whole. 399 The shift in mining policy towards privatisation and the adoption of foreign capital is 
the result of several different complex forces, such as the ideological belief in the natural 
superiority of private economic activity over state or public economic activity.400 Chile today has 
a thin veneer of democratic activity, although it is tightly controlled by the military and police 
forces. This gives the elite and their policy makers carte blanche to implement their policies. 
Chile like Zambia, has also experienced substantial pressure from the multilateral institutions 
such as IMF, to privatise and open the economy. 401The multilateral institutions have 
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considerable power in Chile because of the enormous public and foreign debt run by the military 
government.402 
In 1977, Chile adopted decree law 1748 concerning  foreign investment in mining which 
provides inter alia the clear contractual obligations of the state and mining companies, provision 
for the repatriation of profits and a new tax code. 
In 1982, when the economy collapsed, government ended up socializing all private debt 
including the banks.403 The state copper company was the bedrock that earned enough foreign 
exchange to stave off complete collapse.404  
In 1981 a new mining law was passed to promote the development of new mining ventures as 
well as the streamlining of existing mining legislation.405 The ultimate goal of this legislation 
was to help double copper production within ten years. This has since been achieved. This law 
established exploration and exploitation concession regulations. The mining code grants rights 
for private individuals to own mining concessions and to be protected from expropriation by the 
government.406 Any compensation by the government would entitle the owner of the concession 
to full compensation to be established by judicial review.407 The aim is to reduce the perception 
of political risk as a guaranteed arrangement for compensation is in place.408 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, most of the rich, high grade ore began to become 
depleted. As a result foreign extraction and processing methods had to be brought in to mine and 
process the lower grade ore.409 These methods were imported mostly from Great Britain which 
already had a developed copper industry.410 
Since the denationalization in the early twentieth century, the copper industry has been 
dominated by the conflict between the need for Chile to subjugate mining to the development 
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needs of the country as a whole that is, to a national economic strategy for development and the 
imperatives of the individual mining companies.411  
The first attempt to subjugate copper to national development imperatives occurred in 1925 
when the government imposed a 6 percent tax on top of the 6 percent that already existed.412 
Until then the government had adopted a lasses-faire policy with a 6 per cent flat tax on 
profits.413 This new tax was designed to increase the “Returned Value” of the copper industry. 
Returned Value was a concept invented by nationalist Chilean economists and adopted by the 
government to designate the amount of value that stayed or returned to Chile from copper 
exports.414 The returned value of copper exports had henceforth been very low because of the 
vertical integration of the copper industries, the lack of forward/backward linkages in mining and 
the government’s laissez faire policy.415 Either Chile had to increase production and therefore 
increase the absolute level of returned value or simply increases the share of returned value. 
5.1 Legal Framework 
All foreign investment in Chile is governed by decree law drawn up in 1974, shortly after the 
coup de ta. This law is designed to liberalise foreign investment and provide a stable legal and 
political framework for foreign investors. The Chilean government has subsidized and continues 
to subsidise the mining industry including and especially copper.416 Technical and financial 
support is given to the mining companies owned by the state.417 Large investments in processing, 
facility expansion and infrastructure improvement are financed and directed through CORFO, 
the state industrial holding company that co-ordinates the mining industry as a whole.418 
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The Chilean Mining Code gives the state absolute, exclusive, inalienable and imprescritible 
ownership of all mines.419 However, anyone may prospect for and establish concessions or 
mining rights for the search or mining of minerals.420 In addition to the Mining Code, foreign 
investors have to observe the law that deals with foreign investment and investment contracts. 
421This inter alia provides for tax invariability for 10 years from start of production, that is, if the 
state changes tax rules, the investor who adopts this guarantee is not required to comply with the 
new rules, access to the foreign exchange market and the right to return capital actually brought 
into the country without being taxed.422  In return, foreign investors have to pay a combined tax 
rate of 42 per cent compared with the current 35 per cent. 423  Companies can choose which tax 
regime to use; either the 36.6 percent effective tax rate or the 49. 5 percent rate with a 20 year 
Stabilization agreement. The rate of royalty payable varies from mineral to mineral but may not 
exceed 5 per cent, while 15 per cent is the rate of corporate income tax. 424 Only the distribution 
of profits and dividends are taxed.425 
 In 1991, the government changed the tax regime by increasing the rate of tax payable426 and the 
changes needed to ensure a steady flow of tax revenues were introduced.427 The effective tax rate 
bore a strong link to the profitability of the sector, a mechanism for the host government to 
siphon away a fraction of any windfall gains above a basic target rate of return.428 Government, 
in its review, allowed CODELCO to capture windfall profits through the profit- tax link.429 The 
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profits of the entrepreneurs were taxed by 10% in the first year, by 15% in the second and third 
year and by 10% in the fourth year.430 
 On June 16, 2005 a new law431 was promulgated, which establishes a specific tax on mining 
activities. A 3 percent royalty on revenues of all privately owned mines was imposed as well as a 
tax consisting of a sliding scale according to copper production from nothing below 12,000 
tonnes per annum to 5 per cent above 50,000 tonnes per annum on production in excess of 
12,000 tonnes per annum.432 Foreign companies that signed a Decree Law 600 contract before 
1st December 2004 and are still liable to a 42 per cent are not affected by this. 433 The most 
important of these laws are organisation start up expenses, interest expense, technical assistance, 
tax losses and asset depreciation which may be accelerated.434  
 
5.2 Effect of Mining on the Economy 
Permissive mining legislation has enabled most private mining companies to avoid paying any 
taxes.435 Private companies extracted and exported 20.8 million tons of copper between 1993 and 
2002, roughly the equivalent of two years of world consumption.436 Sales amounted to more than 
34 billion US dollars, with net earnings of roughly half of that sum. Meanwhile, private 
companies have paid just 1.7 billion US dollars in taxes, while accumulating 2.6 billion dollars in 
tax credits, thus holding the Chilean state liable for a net 900 million US dollars. 437At the same 
time, copper overproduction associated with the Chilean copper boom of the 1990s resulted in a 
severe and prolonged decline of world copper prices.438  
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Economic growth decreased slightly in 1999 due to depressed copper prices.439 Mining and 
Mineral products account for 8.5 per cent of Chile’s GDP and nearly half of Chile’s total 
earnings of which 80 percent is attributable to copper.440 Investment in Chile’s mining sector has 
grown substantially over the past decade with mining related investment spending increasing to $ 
2 billion in 2001.441 According to Chile’s state Copper Commission (COCHILCO), investment 
in the mining industry during the period 2004 – 2008 was estimated to reach US$ 15.2 billion. 
442Almost 50% of this total will be invested by CODELCO the state copper mining company, 
with US$11.6 billion being invested in copper projects (new and expansion of existing 
projects).443  In 2006, CODELCO contributed 9.2 billion dollars to the state coffer – over 20 
percent of state revenue.444  In 2007, the state received approximately US$16billion from 
CODELCO profits and taxes on private mining companies.445 Taking a medium-term approach, 
fiscal policy has focused on ensuring financial sustainability and the capacity to satisfy the needs 
of the population during times of crisis, on long-term budgetary restrictions and on efficiency in 
public administration.446 In addition to fostering stability of social policies, fiscal policy has 
increased public saving during periods of boom.447 It has also enhanced the credibility of Chile's 
fiscal authorities as issuers of international debt, improving access to external financing during 
periods of negative external shocks and minimizing the contagion effect of international crises. It 
has reduced the economy's need to rely on external financing.448 
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The country’s tax legislation is both conceptually faulty and permissive, and, as a result, mining 
companies largely avoid paying taxes.449 Consequently, Chile like other mineral resource rich 
countries has not experienced sustained economic development.450 Sudden wealth may have 
detrimental effects on social and political life, leading to or supporting corruption, authoritarian 
government, human rights abuse, or armed conflict.451 The solution is to find better ways to 
capture and manage mineral wealth and to ensure that it is invested for lasting benefits in support 
of national or local development.452 
Sound and stable macro –economic policies have resulted in a healthy investment climate. Chile 
has also successfully reduced dependence on its principal resource copper by diversifying its 
export base.453 The combination of a rich mineral endowment and suitable government policies 
has provided an impressive boost to the economic growth of Chile.454 
 Debate on how resource rich countries can benefit from revenue derived from such resources 
have heated up because of the high international prices of copper seen since 2003.455 According 
to a COCHILCO (Chilean Copper Commission) report, the average price of copper for 2007 was 
323 cents of a dollar per pound on the London Metal Exchange.456 This is 5.9 per cent higher 
than the average for 2006 and is the highest nominal value in history and the third highest in real 
terms after 1966 and 1969.457 While predictions for 2009 were made, estimating the world 
copper prices to show a drop, there has been a drastic reduction in the price of copper on the 
London Metal Exchange.458  
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The very high prices of the copper boom lasted from 2003 – 2008, an unprecedented record in 
copper mining. Due to the high prices, the industry’s contribution to GDP measured at the above 
prices rose from 8.3 per cent in 2003 to 23 percent in 2006.459 
The Mining Ministry’s public report for 2007 states that mining development has brought about 
considerable poverty reduction.460 This is due to the specific tax on mining approved in 2005, 
together with the direct revenue that comes from the mines owned by the government through 
CODELCO. Chile also has in place prudent fiscal policies and savings from the windfall copper 
revenue generated by record prices.461 The proportion of those living in extreme poverty fell 
from 17.4 per cent in 1987 to 4.7 per cent in 2003.462 Mining has brought more and better jobs, 
development of physical infrastructure, opportunities for companies to supply goods and services 
and the incorporation of new technology among other benefits.463 Proposals have also been made 
by the political as well as social sectors on how to make the most of the copper boom by 
improving education, investing in public capital goods ( mainly in the health sector) supporting 
small and medium-sized businesses.464 
 
5.3 Capturing the Windfall Profits 
Resource wealth has brought unstable nations to their knees by spawning war or corruption. 
465Wealthy nations have also been known to have had problems handling commodity booms, 
which can drive up currencies, batter their exporters and produce unsustainable surges in 
imports.466 
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Chile is trying to innoculate itself. The government is saving what it calculates as windfall profits 
from its state owned copper company and windfall taxes from privately owned mines. 467 The 
policy of soaking away windfall copper profits pushed 2007’s fiscal surplus to another historic 
high  leaving it in a solid position to weather global economic volatility. 
 
 Windfall profits from sales of copper, a key component to infrstructure development and 
expansión have been strictly managed by the Chilean government under policies focused on 
saving for leaner times.468 
 
5.4 Comparative analysis: Zambia and Chile 
While appreciating that Zambia and Chile have different historical backgrounds, political and 
economic, it is important to note that both in fact are poverty stricken countries with a large 
mineral endowment which has not been exploited to boost the economies of these countries. 
Zambia is still grappling to find a solution to this problem. Despite having a suitable investment 
climate, it is doubtful that the macro economic policies in place together with the available 
institutions are adequate. It is also doubtful whether there is in fact prudent use of available 
resources.  
Chile on the other hand has made tremendous strides in achieving sound economic policies that 
go with the overall objective of economic development.  The Chilean experience may provide 
guidance for mineral rich developing nations seeking to follow a similar path.   
 
The establishment of the state owned copper producer CODELCO, in 1970 has made an 
important contribution to government revenues.469 The mixed private and public ownership of 
the mineral sector has aided the Chilean government to reap the benefits of mineral 
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exploitation.470 In Zambia, the government does not have full ownership and control of the 
mines, but only has a percentage equity ownership. This is held through an investment Holding 
company ZCCM-IH which has very little (if any) influence over the mines.  
Limited government spending during windfall periods increased the credibility of the 
government.471 Windfall gains were successfully saved for periods when the copper prices would 
drop and to reduce public debt.472 Part of these proceeds have also been invested abroad in other 
currency (as such the flows do not enter the economy directly), the stock funds and the Treasury 
enhanced.473 Chile has in place a tax regime which provides adequate rates of taxes to be 
payable, which are also sufficient during periods of high copper prices.  Zambia on the other 
hand does not have adequate laws prescribing adequate rates of tax. The flexibility in the mining 
laws for investors to negotiate lower rates of taxes vitiates the very essence of the law. 
Chile has a state-owned and managed “copper stabilization fund” which was established in 1985, 
into which it saves part of state copper revenues during high price cycles, which are distributed 
during depressive cycles.474 CODELCO’s total tax bill amounted to an annual average of 396.4 
million US dollars.475 CODELCO is a state-owned company, and as such, must pay a royalty of 
10 per cent of sales directly to the military and a special 12 per cent surtax, over and above the 
normal 15 per cent tax every company operating in Chile must pay on profits. 476 This fund has 
greatly reduced the impact of copper price fluctuations. The reduced vulnerability to world price 
changes also has positive effects on the real exchange rate and on government revenues.477 In the 
absence of an especially dedicated fund to save copper prices, gains from copper form part of the 
general revenue of the government and can be used as governments wishes. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 It is quiete clear from the analysis provided in this Chapter that proactiveness on the part of the 
government, in putting in place adequate legislation, sound macro-economic policies, creating an 
investor friendly climate, having effective institutions in place are all factors that can help a 
mineral endowed country reap the benefits from its natural resources. These factors do not work 
in isolation, as we have seen from the Zambian scenario. It is evident that Chiles investment 
policies are not just meant to attract foreign direct investment but that there is some benefit 
flowing to the ordinary man. Chile is also looking ahead to the future; in times of high 
commodity prices on the world market, the legislation in place can capture the windfall profits. It 
has taken charge of the situation by allowing government ownership of the mines, and 
government decides how the resources are to be used. While private investors usually have a 
tendency not to give a proper account of production and the books of account, and are not 
compellable to publish the same, Government through taxes , raises additional revenue  and 
compete with the private investors in the economic affairs of  the country , especially that these 
industries have an impact in shaping the economy.  
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Chapter 6 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The conclusion will give recommendations on how proper implementation of the copper mining 
windfall combined with the existence of other factors can lead to meaningful development and 
economic growth for Zambia 
The aim of this paper was to show the use, effectiveness and efficiency of tax incentives as 
instruments for promoting or attracting the inflow of FDI in developing countries and especially 
Zambia. In particular, it analysed how imposition of a mining windfall tax can capture the 
windfall profits that come about as a result of unanticipated high prices of copper on the world 
market. 
It has been demonstrated that windfall profits may be temporary or cyclical in nature, called 
economic profits or more structural or permanent in which case they will be referred to as 
economic rent.478 Certain principles (simplify taxation of company’s, provide predictability in 
tax policy, time consistency in tax policy) ought to be born in mind when imposing a windfall 
tax, these must not be compromised. 479 
Taxation of pure economic rent of a structural nature does not affect Company’s behaviour; the 
taxation of rents of a short/cyclical nature will affect company’s behaviour and has an impact on 
resource allocation, resulting in distortions.480 A distinction being made between permanent and 
temporary rents.  Taxing a windfall is non distortionary since it can only be imposed ex post, 
after a windfall.481  
In considering whether or not to implement a windfall tax, a proper analysis must be made 
whether current prices reflect a structural or permanent change that would justify a new fiscal 
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intervention.482 If it is not possible to come to a definite conclusion, it would be inadvisable to 
proceed with a windfall tax. Gains could be shared through royalties, state equity stakes or 
normal corporate tax income. 483 
Windfall taxes are imposed as they provide a guide to capital allocation.484  Societal capture of 
windfalls does not affect incentives to engage in productive activity and therefore does not 
discourage effort or enterprise.485 Windfall taxes are also said to redress the perceived regulatory 
imbalances.486 They allow nascent regulatory institutions to do their job. Further, they 
redistribute profit earned by a specific industry.487  There is no private market mechanism for 
redistributing windfalls because parties experiencing gains are unlikely to report their good 
fortune.488  As has been shown, investors do not provide financial records or records of 
production. The state comes in to distribute the windfalls. Leaving windfalls where they fall 
means that few individuals experience large gains while most receive nothing.489 As such, risk 
averse citizens will not find appealing the idea of leaving windfalls where they fall490. They will 
prefer to capture them and distribute them evenly over the entire citizenry.491 
Windfalls also raise additional revenue for the fiscus.492 By raising revenue via a non-
distortionary tax, windfall captures reduces dead weight losses.493 It will also reduce the tax bill 
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of the vast majority that do not enjoy significant windfalls.494 It is, therefore, a less burdensome 
means of raising revenue.  
The foregoing provides efficiency reasons for capturing windfalls: if properly implemented they 
improve social welfare. It should however be noted that windfall taxation should be imposed 
judiciously as windfall profits are uncommon and by definition are not recurring events.495 
 
Although tax incentives continue to dominate Zambia’s efforts of attracting FDI, they have 
largely been challenged by policy makers, academics and economists for not being effective and 
efficient means of attracting FDI.496 Granting tax incentives means that a country has to forego 
some or all of the revenue which was due to the country.497 If the benefits of the FDI do not 
outweigh the costs of revenue foregone, then the whole investment issue becomes nothing but a 
drain of the country’s resources.498 
It is clear that developing nation’s competition for attracting FDI using tax incentives does not 
add any value to their economies. However they still continue to use them. Zambia has 
promulgated favourable laws and policies to create a favourable investment climate. It however, 
failed to capture the windfall profits that came with the rise in the copper prices as has been 
outlined above. This begs the question, what should Zambia (and other developing countries do) 
to avoid being caught up and losing out. 
6.1 Recommendations: 
It is important that the country addresses other problems/challenges that make them not attract 
foreign capital inflow.  The following recommendations if properly implemented provide a 
guideline as how a country can benefit from its resource wealth; 
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1. Deliberate measures must be taken to improve the macroeconomic policies of the country 
through reduced external debt which impacts on the balance of payments, improve 
human and physical infrastructure such as education, transportation/road network and 
telecommunication networks. A windfall tax alone, cannot be used to improve social 
welfare, it will work in the wider context of other economic policies. 
2. In considering whether or not to implement a windfall tax, a proper analysis must be 
made whether current prices reflect a structural or permanent change that would justify a 
new fiscal intervention.499 Some countries, such as South Africa, have established Task 
Teams to look into whether there are windfall profits and recommend possible 
interventions by Government.  
3. Reforms must be undertaken to the tax system of the regime well in advance, by creating 
efficiency and transparency in tax collection. Ideally this should combine some upfront 
revenue with sufficient progressivity to provide government with an adequate share of 
economic rent under variable conditions of profitability.500 This can be achieved through 
a tax based system  combining a corporate income tax  with a rate of return based 
resource rent (or a progressive profit tax)  and desirably a royalty to secure some upfront 
revenue.501  
4. The period for tax holidays (which have a distortionary effect) should be reduced so that 
existing investments are used to foster fiscal stability, build infrastructure and spend on 
health, education and training for the labour force. 
5. Since the rationale for using tax incentives is that they help to compensate for a country’s 
negative investment climate in terms of political risks, countries must be proactive in the 
dissemination of accurate information so that investors do not negotiate for incentives on 
the basis of risk which may be non- existent. 
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6. Regional groupings should be encouraged which may agree on acceptable rules for the 
promotion of FDI and not left to individual countries. 
7. The capacity of a country to competently administer a complex taxation based system 
must be taken into account when designing the fiscal regime, and attempts should be 
made to keep the legislation and administration as simple as possible while maintaining 
sufficient safeguards to counter tax avoidance.502 
8. Mineral extraction will have intergenerational consequences that should be taken into 
account. Extraction of minerals reduces the net wealth of a country to the detriment of 
future generations.503 This can be addressed through the establishment of a separate fund 
for the revenue generated from mineral extraction to be invested for future generations. A 
stabilization fund can also be established for the revenue that is captured during windfall 
periods that can be used to improve the social welfare in times when prices are down. 
Stabilisation Funds provide a basis for resource rents to support long term development 
beyond the exhaustion of finite resources.504 
 
The proponents of windfall taxes claim that such a tax would not distort economic decisions or 
markets because the profits to be taxed are both abnormally high and unanticipated.505 By this 
reasoning when a company’s profits are unusually high, government can tax those higher profits 
without reducing the resources needed to finance ordinary expenses and investment, and 
consequently, without constraining a company’s ability to generate normal rates of return.506 It is 
further claimed that taxing unanticipated profits will not distort investment and production 
decisions, because unanticipated profits cannot be a factor in the company’s decisions and 
investments.507 Based on this reasoning, a tax on windfall profits seems to provide a unique way 
                                                            
502 Ibid 
503 Ibid 
504 Possible Reforms to the Fiscal Regime applicable to windfall profits in South Africa’s Liquid Fuel Energy Sector 
with particular Reference to the Synthetic Fuel Industry 2006 - A discussion document for public comment. 
505 Shapiro Robert and Pham Nam 2005, The Economic impact of a Windfall Profit Tax for Savers and 
Shareholders, Investors Action Foundation. 
506 Ibid 
507 Ibid 
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of raising substantial revenues without distorting economic efficiency. Proper implementation of 
a windfall tax, taking into account the recommendations outlined above will achieve sustainable 
economic development, improve social welfare and enhance the flow of foreign direct 
investment to a country. 
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